Wilfrid Laurier University

Scholars Commons @ Laurier
Southern African Migration Programme

Reports and Papers

2017

Harnessing Migration for Inclusive Growth and Development in
Southern Africa
Jonathan Crush
Balsillie School of International Affairs/WLU, jcrush@wlu.ca

Belinda Dodson
Western University

Vincent Williams
Daniel Tevara
University of the Western Cape

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/samp
Part of the Human Geography Commons, Migration Studies Commons, and the Political Science
Commons

Recommended Citation
Crush, J., Dodson, B., Williams, V., & Tevara, D. (2017). Harnessing Migration for Inclusive Growth and
Development in Southern Africa (pp. i-64). Vienna: International Centre for Migration Policy Development
and Waterloo, ON: Southern African Migration Programme.

This SAMP Special Reports is brought to you for free and open access by the Reports and Papers at Scholars
Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Southern African Migration Programme by an authorized
administrator of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.

Special Report

HARNESSING MIGRATION
FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH AND
DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

HARNESSING MIGRATION
FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH AND
DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
SPECIAL REPORT

Jonathan Crush, Belinda Dodson,
Vincent Williams, Daniel Tevera

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This project was funded by UK aid from the UK government; however, the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK
government’s official policies. We would like to thank the following for their assistance with various aspects of the conceptualization, research, writing and production of this report: Fiona Clark, Bronwen Dachs, Caroline Skinner, Cathy Chames,
Nana Davies, Tracey Phillips, Andries Mangokwana, Mariella Salamone and Saskia Greyling. Our thanks also to the many
individuals and organizations who consented to be interviewed for this study and to Southern Hemisphere Consulting for
conducting the interviews.

© Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) 2017
Published by the Southern African Migration Programme, International Migration Research Centre, Balsillie School of
International Affairs, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
http://samponline.org
First published 2017
ISBN 978-1-920596-32-3
Production by Bronwen Dachs Muller, Cape Town
Printed by Topcopy, Cape Town
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without
prior permission from the publisher

TABLE OF CONTENTS
iv Lists of Tables, Figures and Appendices
v

Acronyms and Abbreviations

vi About the Authors
1

Executive Summary

7

Chapter 1: Goal and Objectives

8

Chapter 2: Methodology

9

Chapter 3: Contextual Analysis: Regional Migration
in Southern Africa
9

Introduction

9

Migration Within Southern Africa

17 Migration to Southern Africa
17 Migration from Southern Africa
20 Harnessing Migration for Development
27 Chapter 4: Migration and Development as a
Regional Challenge in Southern Africa
27 Introduction
27 Perceptions of Migration as a Regional
		

Development Issue

28 Migration Initiatives and the SADC Secretariat
30 Gender Analysis of Regional Initiatives
32 Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA)
33 Challenges Facing a Regional Response
34 South Africa’s New Migration Paradigm
38 Chapter 5: Options and Entry Points
38 Introduction
38 Priority Programming Areas Identified in Migration
		Instruments
46 Opportunities Assessment
47 Stakeholder Recommendations
48 Gender and Migration Programming for
		

Development and Inclusive Growth

60 Endnotes

HARNESSING MIGRATION FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

9

11

Table 1: Total Migrant Stock of Southern African
Countries, 1990-2015

10

Table 2: SADC Migrants in Other SADC Countries,

from Other Southern African Countries, 1970-2014
12

2015
12

Table 3: Asylum Applications in South Africa,
2002-2015

15

Table 4: Employment Sectors of Migrants and South
African Citizens

15

Table 5: Occupations of Migrants and South Africans

17

Table 6: Region of Origin of Migrants in Southern
Africa, 2015

19

Figure 1: Total Number of Refugees in Southern Africa

Figure 2: Total Number of Refugees in Southern Africa
from Outside Southern Africa, 1985-2014

14

Figure 3: Education Levels of Migrants in South Africa

16

Figure 4: Top Ten Migrant Occupations in Zambia

18

Figure 5: Country of Origin of New Work Permit
Holders in South Africa, 2014

18

Figure 6: Country of Origin of Work Permit Holders
in Botswana, 2012

19

Table 7: Destination of Southern African Migrants,

Figure 7: Country of Origin of Work Permit Holders
in Zambia, 2009-2012

2015
20

Table 8: Diaspora Origins and Locations, 2015

20

Table 9: Major Diaspora Corridors, 2015

21

Table 10: Proportion of Male and Female Migrants

23

Table 11: Social Security Benefits Owed to
Ex-Mineworkers

23

Table 12: Remittance Flows within and to Southern
Africa (USD million)

24

Table 13: International and Internal Goods Remitting
in Southern Africa, 2008

38

Table 14: Programming Framework

39

Table 15: Analysis of Recommendations in Regional
Instruments

47

Table 16: Stakeholder Programming
Recommendations

48

Table 17: Proposed Entry Points in Programming
Framework

54

Table 18: Diaspora Engagement Policies of SADC
Governments

iv • SOUTHERN AFRICAN MIGRATION PROGRAMME

LIST OF APPENDICES
56

Appendix A: Stakeholder Consultations

58

Appendix B: List of Key Sources



ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACRONYMS AND
ABBREVIATIONS

LHR

Lawyers for Human Rights

LMPF

Labour Migration Policy Framework

MIDSA

Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa

ACMS

African Centre for Migration and Society

MiWorc

Migrating for Work Research Consortium

ACP

African Common Position on Migration and

NGOs

Non-Governmental Organizations

NIDS

National Income Dynamics Study

ODI

Overseas Development Institute

OSISA

Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa

PASSOP

People Against Suffering, Oppression and

Development
AU

African Union

AUF

African Union Framework

BLS

Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland

CESARE

Co-operation for the Enhancement of SADC
Regional Economic Integration

COMESA

Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa

Poverty
PF

Programming Framework

PRSPs

Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan

QLFS

Quarterly Labour Force Survey

RCPs

African Regional Consultative Processes

RISDP

Regional Indicative Strategic Development

CSO

Civil Society Organization

DFID

Department for International Development

DRC

Democratic Republic of the Congo

DWP

Decent Work Programme

EAC

East African Community

EU

European Union

GCRO

Gauteng City-Region Observatory

SAMP

Southern African Migration Programme

GP

Green Paper on International Migration

SAT

Southern Africa Trust

ICBT

Informal Cross-Border Trade

SATUC

South African Trade Union Council

ICMPD

International Centre for Migration Policy

SDGs

Sustainable Development Goals

SIDA

Swedish International Development

Development
ICRMW

Plan
SADC

SADSAWU South African Domestic Service and
Allied Workers Union

International Convention on the Protection of
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families

IDPs

Internally Displaced People

IFAD

International Fund for Agricultural

Southern African Development Community

Co-operation Agency
SURE

Scaling Up Remittances

TEBA

The Employment Bureau of Africa

TVET

Technical and Vocational Education and
Training

Development
UN

United Nations

Farmworkers Developmental

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

ILO

International Labour Organization

UNECA

United Nations Economic Commission for

IMRC

International Migration Research Centre

IOC

Indian Ocean Commission

IOM

International Organization for Migration

JLMP

Joint Labour Migration Programme

JPCs

Joint Permanent Commissions

VA

Valetta Accord

LEDRIZ

Labour and Economic Development Research

ZCTU

Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions

IFALLFD

Institute for Applied Labour Law and

Africa
UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees

UNRISD

United Nations Research Institute for Social
Development

Institute of Zimbabwe

SAMP • v

HARNESSING MIGRATION FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Dr Jonathan Crush is a professor and the CIGI Chair in
Global Migration and Development at the Balsillie School
of International Affairs (BSIA), Waterloo, Canada. He is the
founder and director of the Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) and has published extensively on issues of
migration and development, diaspora engagement and food
security in Africa.
Dr Belinda Dodson is an associate professor in the Department of Geography at Western University, London, Ontario,
Canada. Her research examines the intersection of gender,
migration and development, with a regional focus on Southern Africa.
Vincent Williams is a South African freelance trainer/
facilitator and researcher for various institutions and organizations. He has been involved in migration policy processes
in South Africa and in the region since 1997.
Dr Daniel Tevera is a professor in the Department of Geography at the University of the Western Cape, South Africa.
His research addresses socio-spatial issues in the Global
South, including urban governance, urban food security
and migration.

vi • SOUTHERN AFRICAN MIGRATION PROGRAMME



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The primary goal of this study is to present the results of a
comprehensive scope of key opportunities and challenges for
harnessing migration for inclusive growth and development
at the regional level in Southern Africa. The main objectives
were as follows:
•

Provide an overview of regional migration stocks and
flows identifying regional trends, drivers and impacts

The first two sections of the report outline the objectives and
methodology of the research. The third section provides a
contextual analysis of regional migration in Southern Africa
to demonstrate that migration is a quintessentially regional
issue and development challenge. There are a number of
reasons why a regional – as opposed to a purely national –
conceptual and policy approach to migration is desirable
and necessary:
•

and constitute one of the major mechanisms of regional

from existing research literature and official data;
•

integration in Southern Africa (along with trade and
investment). Goods and capital move relatively freely

Profile migrant characteristics at the regional level

and legally across the region but people still face consid-

including demographic composition, types of migration

erable obstacles and barriers to movement;

and occupational profile;
•

Examine the relevance of multilateral, continental and

•

extremely uneven migration flows. All countries both

agreements and forums with a view to identifying actions

send and receive migrants but the balance between the

required to move the regional migration management

two varies significantly. Zimbabwe was a major destina-

agenda forward and align with the goal of enhancing

tion before 2000 but has since become the region’s single

migration for inclusive growth and development in

largest exporter of migrants. South Africa is the major

Southern Africa;
Analyze the key initiatives, opportunities and obstacles
to developing a coherent, integrated and rights-regarding

destination;
•

and communities through formal and informal transfers

common commitment and ownership, and points of

of cash and goods in the form of remittances. In effect,

actual and potential conflict and disagreement between

migration and remittances have become a major source

states;
Conduct a gender analysis of regional migration dynamics including gender dimensions of migration, challenges,

of development finance across the region;
•

The majority of migration movements within and to the
Southern African region fall into the category of South-

dangers and vulnerabilities confronting migrant women

South migration. This form of migration, from one

and other vulnerable groups, and gender analysis of

•

Temporary, circular migration is the norm in the region
with migrants retaining close ties with home countries

approach to migration management including areas of

•

Vast differences in levels of development and employment opportunities across the region have led to

regional migration instruments, policies, protocols,

•

Cross-border movements of people have a long history

migration management in Southern Africa;

developing country to another, can have positive and

Identify potential programming areas that are weak or

of origin and destination;

underdeveloped.

simultaneous development impacts on both countries

•

From a migration management perspective, regional

The report relies on data and information from four main

organizations have recognized the importance of regional

sources: (a) existing research literature and data on regional

harmonization and co-ordinated action. However, gov-

migration dynamics and trends in Southern Africa; (b)

ernments have been slower to recognize the reality of

official data sources, where available, to identify current

regional migration, leading to a disjuncture between

patterns, trends and types of migration; (c) bilateral global

initiatives to facilitate movement and co-ordinate migra-

migration data sets compiled by the UNDP and the World

tion for development at the continental and regional

Bank; and (d) a programme of field research involving key

level, and national governments that tend to view migra-

informant interviews and consultations with stakeholders,

tion negatively and avoid any binding commitment to

international organizations and donors, national govern-

regional migration processes and instruments.

ment departments, and representatives from civil society,
business, labour and the academy. Country visits were
undertaken to South Africa, Mozambique, Botswana and
Zimbabwe. A total of 60 interviews were conducted with 86
interviewees.

The analysis of migration trends and flows distinguishes
between (a) migration within the Southern African region
from one country to another; (b) migration to Southern
Africa from other countries, especially the rest of Africa;
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and (c) migration from Southern Africa to other parts of the

informal entrepreneurship and (e) diasporas for develop-

globe. Each has implications and opportunities for harness-

ment. Although the available information on each area is

ing migration for development and inclusive growth. For

uneven across the region, evidence is marshalled to sug-

example:

gest that each offers important opportunities for meeting

•

All of the countries of Southern Africa host some
migrants, with the major migration destinations being
South Africa, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC), Tanzania, Mozambique, Malawi and Botswana. All are also migrant-sending countries with the
major intra-regional senders being Mozambique, Zim-

•

the overall goal of harnessing migration for development
and inclusive growth. These areas are united by a focus on
the importance and development implications of women’s
migration. The major findings from the analysis of these five
areas include the following:
•

of migration with increased independent women’s migra-

sends migrants to other countries in the region. In pol-

tion. The number of female migrants in SADC is now

icy terms, this means that although many countries are

over 2 million. In the major destination country (South

threatened by what they view as an uncontrolled influx

Africa), the proportion of female migrants has reached

of migrants, they are themselves also migrant senders

40% of the total. Gender-disaggregated data on migrant

and beneficiaries of out-migration to other countries.

flows and occupations is generally unavailable, although
South African data suggests that a migrant woman has

Migration flows within the region have undergone major

only a 56% probability of being employed compared to

changes in the last two decades, including a significant

a migrant man.

decline in forced (refugee) migration, an equally significant increase in migration for economic and livelihood

•

Southern Africa is undergoing a process of feminization

babwe, Lesotho, Malawi and Angola. Even South Africa

•

There is a growing body of case-study evidence on infor-

reasons, more diversity in flows including increasing

mal temporary migration and the low wage regime and

female and youth migration, a decline in formal contract

exploitative conditions in sectors such as construction,

migration to South African mines, and a concomitant

illicit mining, commercial agriculture and domestic

increase in unregulated, informalized migration across

work. For those migrant women who are employed,

borders. Data and reliable information on all of these

many are engaged in precarious livelihoods. Some are

trends and their drivers are largely absent.

employed in potentially exploitative conditions with
weak oversight or protection of their labour rights, for

In total, 53% of all Southern Africa-born migrants are

example as domestic or agricultural workers. Others are

living outside the region. The five major sending coun-

engaged in inherently precarious informal occupations

tries are South Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola, the DRC and

such as trading, hair braiding and other beauty services,

Mauritius. The five major destinations are the United

or craft production and sales, often conducted in unsafe

Kingdom, Australia, France, the United States and Por-

spaces. Related to their precarious working and living

tugal. Shared histories and common languages have

conditions, female migrants experience gender-based

resulted in the emergence of migration corridors that

violence and other health vulnerabilities.

include South Africa-UK, South Africa-Australia, AngolaPortugal, Zimbabwe-UK and Madagascar-France. The

•

Poor treatment of female migrants on the way to and at

majority of migrants who leave the region are relatively

the workplace exercises an extremely negative impact

skilled, leading to claims that countries of destination

on the migrants themselves and their households, and

are responsible for a “brain drain” from the region. This

is also antithetical to development and inclusive growth

argument has largely been replaced by the realization

in their home countries. Low wages and other forms of

that these migrants are actually a resource with a poten-

financial extortion, for example, significantly reduce the

tially strong development role to play.

remitting ability of migrants. Precarious employment in
the agricultural and domestic service sectors is highly

Against the backdrop of complex and shifting migration pat-

gendered with female migrants being most vulnerable to

terns and flows, the report identifies key development-related

exploitation by formal and informal labour brokers and

implications of these migration trends and characteristics

recruiters, employers and the authorities (especially the

and presents relevant information and data on each. This

police).

provides substantive context and a link to the programming recommendations later in the report. The five areas

•

There is a considerable evidence that remitting is an

are: (a) gender and migration; (b) migrant rights and pro-

extremely common practice in Southern Africa. How-

tections; (c) migration and remittances; (d) migration and

ever, much remitting is through informal channels, and

2 • SOUTHERN AFRICAN MIGRATION PROGRAMME
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accurate data on remittance flows at the regional level is

projects in Zambia related to education, healthcare,

not available. The World Bank calculates that remittance

infrastructure development, childcare and microfinance

flows to the countries of Southern Africa reached USD1

initiatives.

billion in 2014. Only a third of remittances to Southern
African countries come from other countries within the
region. Over two-thirds of remittances to Southern African countries therefore come from outside the region.
•

•

that many felt they have an important role to play
in developing their countries of origin. The majority
remit money to their country of origin. Preferred avenues of engagement include skills transfer, investing

per capita amount of remittances as male migrants but

in businesses, participation in development projects,

women tend to send a higher proportion of their income.

educational exchanges, volunteer work, fundraising for

Women also usually send money more regularly and for

development projects, philanthropy, export and import

longer periods of time than men. In Southern Africa

of goods to and from the country of origin, investing

there is some evidence of distinct gender differences in

in infrastructural development and providing distance

remitting amounts, frequency and means of remitting,

learning. Others specifically mentioned their desire to be

remittance recipients and use of remittances. This sug-

involved in activities that would lead to greater empow-

gests that data, research and policy-making on migration

erment for women and children.
The next section of the report examines the policy impli-

The number of migrants running small and micro-

cations of the information about migration flows and

enterprises or being employed by these businesses is

development implications provided in the previous section.

considerable in towns and cities across the region. In

There was a considerable degree of unanimity among the

South Africa, as many as one-third of migrants are self-

stakeholders interviewed for this study on the importance of

employed in the informal economy. Surveys of migrant

seeing migration as a regional development issue requiring

entrepreneurs show that the sector is dominated by

a co-ordinated regional response in Southern Africa. There

young people and that women occupy particular niches.

was some expectation of a difference in opinion between

Informal business owners have positive development

regional and national stakeholders. However, many of the

impacts in countries of destination and origin through

latter were also willing to acknowledge that migration was

remittance of business profits, generating employment,

not purely an issue of national importance. Where they dif-

rental of business properties, providing cheaper services,

fered was on who should be driving the agenda: national

supporting formal sector businesses and payment of

governments or regional bodies.

operating licences to municipalities.
•

A study of immigrants from the SADC in Canada found

Globally, female migrants send approximately the same

and remittances needs to be gender-disaggregated.
•

•

In principle, there is significant awareness among SADC

The major challenges to business survival and expansion

member states about the need to strengthen efforts aimed at

include difficulties of securing start-up capital and busi-

harnessing migration for inclusive growth and development.

ness loans from formal financial institutions, especially

In practice, little progress has been made on mainstream-

banks; lack of basic business training and skills; exclusion

ing migration and development at the national or regional

from formal banking systems; vulnerability to xeno-

policy level. Regional efforts to forge a common approach

phobic attacks and destruction of stock and businesses

to migration appear promising but, while states appear

premises; and hostile operating environments including

willing to make initial commitments to agreements, instru-

official harassment, extortion and demands for bribes or

ments and initiatives, they are generally unwilling to ratify

protection money.

and implement anything that appears to infringe on their

While many governments are developing plans and

national sovereignty or the perceived interests of citizens.

policies for diaspora engagement, an important informa-

At the regional level, there is a paucity of instruments that

tion gap concerns the attitudes of diasporas themselves

focus directly on migration and development. An evalua-

to engagement in development-related activities and

tion of the SADC Secretariat’s Regional Indicative Strategic

initiatives in their countries of origin. A study of the

Development Plan (RISDP) has concluded that “the relation-

global Zambian diaspora showed that most are inter-

ship between migration and poverty is under-represented in

ested in making private investments in Zambia, with

the plan’s proposed intervention areas and only addressed

the greatest sectoral interest in agriculture/horticulture,

in a partial and circumscribed manner.” Freedom of intra-

import/export, manufacturing, tourism and transport.

regional movement has been a principle of the SADC since

Many expressed interest in contributing to development

its foundation, although this is not explicitly tied to positive
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development outcomes. Despite this objective, unfettered

Social Security, ILO Conventions 87, 100, 111 and 182, the

free movement is very far from being a reality. The Secretar-

Convention Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Work-

iat has had no success in getting all member states to ratify

ers (Domestic Workers Convention), the SADC Protocol on

its two major regional mobility policy initiatives: the 1995

Employment and Labour, and the SADC Regional Labour

Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons and the

Migration Policy Framework and concludes that, as with the

2005 Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons.

effort to implement freedom of movement, ratification and

Greater regional mobility initiatives are trumped by national

implementation are proving problematical as few member

immigration policies focused on movement control.

states are willing to ratify the appropriate instruments. A

SADC member states prefer to act bilaterally in their dealings
with each other on migration through instruments such as
Joint Permanent Commissions (JPCs) and Memoranda of

gender analysis of the various African Union (AU) and SADC
strategic instruments shows that gender and migration issues
feature only in piecemeal fashion.

Understanding. At the level of individual member states, the

Regional-level instruments, polices and protocols do exist,

mandate and expertise required for, and resources devoted

but these are barely enforced and national laws and insti-

to, migration management is often limited to routine and

tutions take precedence. The persistent limitations of

operational capacity requirements, as opposed to a more

migration governance on the continent are recognized as

strategic approach in which migration management is an

an obstacle to regional and continental poverty reduction.

essential component of development objectives.

Furthermore, policies and instruments to protect migrant

Little discernible progress has therefore been made with
regard to the implementation of a free movement regime
by the SADC Secretariat. In part, this is because there is very
little data or analysis on exactly what the impact of removing border controls in the region would be. In many ways,
the SADC is already a de facto free movement zone and the
removal of controls would not have a massive impact on
migration flows. What it would do is provide legal channels for those who want to migrate, reduce the opportunities
for personal enrichment by corrupt state functionaries on
both sides of borders, eliminate current high levels of corruption and abuse in the immigration system and reduce the

and gender rights are implemented within a difficult social
and political context in which xenophobic and patriarchal attitudes persist. In sum, there are many challenges in
advancing gender-sensitive, rights-based migration governance in the SADC region. The scale, complexity and diversity
of migration, combined with incomplete and inconsistent
data, make it difficult to measure and monitor the gender
composition of migrant flows and stocks, or to understand
the particular contributions and vulnerabilities of female
migrants. A dual focus on empowerment and protection
should guide programming and policy development on
gender and migration in the region.

exploitation of migrants who enjoy few rights and protec-

The final section of the report makes specific recommen-

tions. However, free movement is likely to remain politically

dations for a future regional programme on harnessing

unpalatable to most states for the foreseeable future.

migration for development and inclusive growth. Given the

One of the key components of inclusive growth strategies is
poverty reduction through productive and decent employment. Given the high levels of poverty and inequality
throughout Southern Africa, it is important to view migrant
employment rights as an integral part of the inclusive growth
agenda. The SADC Secretariat has made various efforts to put
in place instruments that commit member states to protecting the rights of migrant workers. A recent study for the

lack of progress at regional and national level in advancing
a migration and development agenda, we argue that programming should focus on “demonstration” projects that
provide clear evidence of the development impacts of migration for countries of origin and destination. These projects
could then be scaled up. In order to establish priority entry
points, the report does three things:
•

Presents the results of the stakeholder perceptions of pri-

United Nations Research Institute for Social Development

orities in which knowledge and information gaps were a

(UNRISD) examined the issue of migrant protection and

recurrent theme;

rights in the Southern African region as a whole and identified the various regional-level commitments to protecting
migrant rights and the obstacles to their implementation.
This report examines various instruments including the UN
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families, the Charter of
Fundamental Social Rights in SADC, the SADC Code on

4 • SOUTHERN AFRICAN MIGRATION PROGRAMME

•

Analyzes and categorizes the recommendations for making migration work for development in the SDGs, the
Valetta Accord and various AU and SADC agreements,
protocols and instruments;
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Develops a Programming Framework (PF) consisting of

programme directed at improving the conditions for

10 core migration and development issues and 27 associ-

women and youth migrating to and working in the

ated potential entry points; and

domestic service sector. The extent to which employers,
labour brokers and governments are in breach of the

This analysis leads to the identification of five major entry

Convention is unknown and needs to be systematically

points in the programming framework under the general

researched. Further, programmes are needed to inform

rubric of a recommended programme on Gender and Migra-

domestic workers of their rights and employers of their

tion for Development and Inclusive Growth in Southern

obligations. Because most migrant women in domestic

Africa. For each point, the report provides a detailed ration-

work tend to move along major migration corridors there

ale, examples of similar programmes and likely outcomes. In

is a strong case for adopting a corridor-focused approach

summary, the five recommended entry points are as follows:
•

to programme implementation. Two corridors in particular are known to be significant avenues for migrant

Entry Point One: Building a Gendered Knowledge

women in domestic work: the Zimbabwe-Gauteng-West-

Base on Migration. One of the recurrent themes in the

ern Cape corridor and the Lesotho-Gauteng corridor. By

stakeholder interviews was (a) the limited public avail-

focusing attention on these two corridors, identifying the

ability and utility of official data on migration; and (b)

problems that migrant domestic workers face and that

the lack of knowledge about regional migration causes,

materially affect the employment conditions of migrant

volumes, experiences and impacts. A common failing of

women, this intervention could have a strong demon-

official data and the case-study research literature is the

stration effect on the need to protect and guarantee the

absence of systematic and generalizable information on

rights of vulnerable workers and ensure that they benefit

the gendered nature of migration. In order to provide

from inclusive economic growth.

detailed, policy-relevant, gender-disaggregated data on
migration and its development impacts, a different methodological approach is needed. There is a need for the
collection of national migration data at the household
level in countries of origin and destination through the
implementation of nationally representative surveys of
migrant-sending households. The knowledge and policy
value of this kind of methodology is clearly illustrated by
previous projects with dated findings that are still widely
cited as authoritative sources of data on all aspects of
migration, including its gender dimensions. These surveys would ensure the collection of data on a range of
critical migration and development issues including
migration drivers, migrant characteristics and motivations, migrant occupations and remitting behaviour,
remittance channels and uses, and general migration
impacts at the household, community and national
scales.
•

Entry Point Two: Protecting Female Migrants in
Domestic Work. The SADC Labour Migration Policy
Framework has as two of its objectives (a) strengthening
protection of the rights of migrant workers; and (b) harnessing positive gender considerations and demographic
dividends. These objectives urgently need to be realized
in the low-wage sectors in which migrant women and
girls tend to concentrate, especially domestic work. A
programme focus on the rights and protection of women
and girl migrants would materially advance the objectives of the Framework and potentially enhance its

•

Entry Point Three: Maximizing Remittance Impacts
for Women Migrants. As the primary source of income
for the majority of migrant-sending households, remittance earnings are vital in enabling households to meet
their basic needs. Food is the most common annual
expenditure of remittance money in both male and
female migrant-sending households. Remittances do
not appear to be spent on non-essential or luxury items
but nor are they commonly directed towards savings
or investment in business or other productive activities. While there is a need for updated regional data
on the gendered dimensions of remitting, the priority
now is to devise practical, actionable programmes of
support which would turn remittances from meeting
basic household consumption needs into sources of
productive investment by recipients at the household
and community levels. There is considerable global and
regional debate about how best to harness remittances
for development and inclusive growth. The Scaling Up
Remittances (SURE) programme of the International
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) is a potential
model for this programme. However, IFAD’s rural focus
assumes that such programmes should concentrate on
rural areas, whereas it is far more likely that the opportunities for the productive use of remittances are greater in
urban areas. Thus, we suggest that programming should
focus more on urban-urban remitting to have tangible
results and benefits for inclusive growth.

implementation as well as that of the Domestic Workers Convention. We therefore recommend a regional

SAMP • 5

HARNESSING MIGRATION FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

•

Entry Point Four: Enhancing Female and Youth

Southern African countries. A regional diaspora engage-

Migrant Entrepreneurship. In cities throughout South-

ment policy for Southern Africa as a whole needs to be

ern Africa, migrants from other countries (including

based on (a) a mapping of existing development-related

forced migrants) are involved in the establishment of

initiatives by members of diasporas from Southern Africa;

small businesses to support themselves and their families

(b) information about the types of engagement activities

and to generate remittances to send back to their home

that members of the diaspora are interested in support-

countries. There is a common perception that migrant

ing or participating in at the regional level; and (c) the

entrepreneurs are “survivalists” , forced to establish their

establishment of mechanisms which would enable and

businesses because of a failure to obtain formal employ-

facilitate engagement at the regional level, perhaps

ment. However, there is a growing body of research that

initially in the form of a platform or marketplace for

highlights the entrepreneurial orientation and motiva-

supporting regional projects. To align this proposal with

tion of the majority of migrant business owners. Studies

the general theme of gender and migration, such a pro-

have identified the following as major business chal-

gramme could focus on diaspora support for projects that

lenges: (a) economic challenges including shortages of

aim to enhance gender equity and the empowerment of

start-up capital, lack of access to credit, competition from

women and girls.

formal sector outlets and suppliers’ high prices; (b) social
challenges such as prejudice against their nationality and
xenophobic attacks; and (c) security challenges such as
crime and theft, confiscation of goods by the police, harassment and demands for bribes and protection money,
and physical attacks. Despite these problems, migrant
entrepreneurs deliver important development benefits
to countries of origin (through remittances) and destination (including cheaper foodstuffs and consumables,
credit facilities, and job creation, as well as generating
economic profits for formal sector suppliers such as
wholesalers and supermarkets). Migrant entrepreneurs
in general, and women and youth in particular, are still
in need of programmes of support in order to address
some of the obstacles they face and to maximize their
entrepreneurial activities and contributions. There is a
dearth of programmes supporting migrant youth and
women’s small and micro-entrepreneurship activities and
initiatives in Southern Africa, particularly as migrants are
generally excluded from government training and support programmes.
•

Entry Point Five: Deploying Diaspora Skills for
Women/Youth Empowerment. There is increasing
interest in the actual and potential role of diasporas
as a resource for development and inclusive growth in
Africa. Diasporas possess five forms of diaspora capital
(the “5 Cs”): intellectual capital, financial capital, political capital, cultural capital and social capital. In order
for African governments and regional organizations
to engage effectively with diasporas, it is important to
understand what motivates diasporas to be involved
in African development: the “3 Ps” of pecuniary interests, private interests and public philanthropic interests.
The global Southern African diaspora represents a large
skills and expertise pool, several million strong, that has
not yet been effectively leveraged for development by
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CHAPTER 1: GOAL AND OBJECTIVES

CHAPTER 1:
GOAL AND OBJECTIVES
The primary goal of this study is to present the results of a
comprehensive scope of key opportunities and challenges for
harnessing migration for inclusive growth and development
at the regional level in Southern Africa.1 The main objectives
of the study were as follows:
•

Provide an overview of regional migration stocks and
flows identifying regional trends, drivers and impacts
from existing research literature and official data;

•

Profile migrant characteristics at the regional level
including demographic composition, types of migration
and occupational profile;

•

Examine the relevance of multilateral, continental and
regional migration instruments, policies, protocols,
agreements and forums with a view to identifying actions
required to move the regional migration management
agenda forward and align with the goal of enhancing
migration for inclusive growth and development in
Southern Africa;

•

Analyze the key initiatives, opportunities and obstacles
to developing a coherent, integrated and rights-regarding
approach to migration management including areas of
common commitment and ownership, and points of
actual and potential conflict and disagreement between
states;

•

Conduct a gender analysis of regional migration dynamics including gender dimensions of migration, challenges,
dangers and vulnerabilities confronting migrant women
and other vulnerable groups and gender analysis of
migration management in Southern Africa; and

•

Inventory current regional migration initiatives by
governments, inter-governmental agencies, the private
sector, civil society and other development partners and
identify potential programming areas that are weak or
underdeveloped.
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CHAPTER 2:
METHODOLOGY
The report relies on data and information from four main
sources:
•

Existing research literature and data on regional migration dynamics and trends in Southern Africa. The
research literature is voluminous but generally adopts
a small-area, small-sample case study approach which
raises questions of representativeness.

•

Official data, where current and available, to identify
current patterns, trends and types of migration. The
International Organization for Migration (IOM) recently
reviewed these official sources in Southern Africa and
concludes that there are “huge gaps” in the data available for the construction of a regional migration picture.2
There is currently no facility in Southern Africa for the
central collection and analysis of migration data at the
regional level.

•

Bilateral global migration data sets compiled by international organizations and agencies. Those used in this
report include:
• United Nations Population Division Bilateral
International Migration Stock 1990-2015
• World Bank Migration and Remittances: Bilateral
Remittance Matrix 2015
• World Bank Remittance Prices Worldwide Database

•

Field research involving key informant interviews and
consultations with stakeholders including international
organizations and donors, national government departments, and representatives from civil society, business,
labour and the academy.3 The fieldwork was undertaken
by a team of four fieldworkers from Southern Hemisphere
Consulting. Four country visits were undertaken to South
Africa, Mozambique, Botswana and Zimbabwe. Regional
interviews were conducted face to face, telephonically
and by email. A total of 60 interviews were conducted
with 86 interviewees. All interviews were transcribed and
analyzed using NVIVO software.
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CHAPTER 3:
CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS:
REGIONAL MIGRATION IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA

migration and remittances have become a major source
of development finance across the region.
•

The majority of migration movements within and to the
Southern African region fall into the category of SouthSouth migration. This form of migration, from one
developing country to another, can have positive and
simultaneous development and inclusive growth impacts
on both countries of origin and destination.

INTRODUCTION

•

There are a number of reasons why migration should be
considered a regional issue, challenge and opportunity in
Southern Africa requiring a regionally co-ordinated response:
•

From a migration management perspective, regional
organizations have recognized the importance of regional
harmonization and co-ordinated action. However, governments have been slower to recognize the reality of
regional migration, leading to a disjuncture between

Cross-border movements of people constitute one of the

initiatives to facilitate movement and co-ordinate at

major mechanisms of regional integration in Southern

the continental and regional level, and national govern-

Africa (along with trade and investment). Goods and cap-

ments that wish to avoid any binding commitment to

ital move relatively freely and legally across the region

regional migration processes and instruments.

but people still face considerable barriers to movement;
•

Vast differences in levels of development and employment opportunities across the region have led to
extremely uneven migration flows.4 All countries both
send and receive migrants but the balance between the
two varies significantly. Zimbabwe was a major destina-

MIGRATION WITHIN SOUTHERN
AFRICA
Migration Patterns

tion before 2000 but has since become the region’s single
There is a common perception that Southern Africa is experi-

largest exporter of migrants.5
•

Temporary, circular migration is the norm in the region
with migrants retaining close ties with home countries
and communities through formal and informal transfers
of cash and goods in the form of remittances. In effect,

encing a major increase in migration numbers. However, UN
migrant stock data for the region calls this into question. The
total number of migrants in the SADC has remained relatively stable since 1990 at around 4.5 million people (Table
1). There have certainly been shifts within the region, with

TABLE 1: TOTAL MIGRANT STOCK OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN COUNTRIES, 1990-2015
2015

% Change
1990-2015

76,549

106,845

+218%

120,912

160,644

+484%

419,649

392,996

+203%

6,414

6,572

-20%

26,058

28,905

32,075

+34%

19,647

24,836

28,585

+691%

1990

1995

2000

2005

Angola

33,517

39,813

46,108

61,329

Botswana

27,510

40,168

57,064

88,829

129,527

191,635

305,002

315,238

8,240

7,240

6,167

6,290

23,917

21,177

23,451

3,613

7,493

15,543

DRC
Lesotho
Madagascar
Mauritius
Malawi

2010

1,127,724

241,624

232,620

221,661

217,722

215,158

-618%

Mozambique

122,332

168,256

195,702

204,830

214,612

222,928

-81%

Namibia

120,641

115,372

134,403

106,274

102,405

93,888

+82%

3,721

5,148

6,574

8,997

11,420

12,791

+244%

1,163,883

1,003,807

1,001,825

1,210,936

1,943,009

Swaziland

72,085

25,031

22,855

27,097

30,476

31,579

-56%

Tanzania

574,025

1,106,043

928,180

770,846

308,600

261,222

-54%

Zambia

279,029

244,338

321,167

252,749

149,637

127,915

-54%

Zimbabwe

626,821

431,226

410,041

392,693

397,891

398,866

-36%

4,316,585

3,648,471

3,706,702

3,713,474

4,053,037

4,401,018

+2%

Seychelles
South Africa

Total

2,309,0446

+98%

Source: United Nations Population Division (2015). Data retrieved on June 10, 2016 from http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/
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seven countries now hosting fewer migrants than they did

and DRC copper mines, and the Swaziland asbestos mine.

in 1990 and seven hosting more. The greatest proportional

The South African gold and platinum mines continue to

increases in migrant stock have been in Botswana, Angola,

employ migrants from other countries, particularly Lesotho,

Mauritius, the Seychelles, the DRC and South Africa. The

Mozambique and Swaziland. However, mine closures and

greatest absolute increase has been in South Africa from 1.1

retrenchments, employment levels in the mining industry

million to 2.3 million people. South Africa has become the

have been falling for two decades. Between 1987 and 2010,

major migration destination, from 29% of all migrants in the

the number of mineworkers fell from 477,000 to 215,000.

region in 1990 to 52% in 2015.

No new migrant mineworkers have been hired from outside

A second common perception is that the countries of Southern Africa are either migrant origin or migrant destination
countries. In fact, all of the states of Southern Africa both
send and receive migrants (Table 2). However, only three
countries (Botswana, South Africa and Tanzania) receive
more migrants than they send. With the exception of the
three island states, every country has at least some migrants
from every other country in the region. In addition, migrants
from one country do not go to only one other country:
Mozambicans and South Africans are the most dispersed
(living in 10 other countries), followed by Congolese and
Zambians (nine other countries), Malawians and Zimbabwe-

South Africa since 2003. The proportion of the mine workforce from outside South Africa fell from 60% in 2003 to only
23% in 2013. The Employment Bureau of Africa (TEBA) estimates that by 2023 there will be no foreign migrants on the
South African mines, thus bringing to an end the contract
labour system that began in the 1890s.7 One of the major
consequences of the phasing out of contract migration has
been an increase in unregulated migration. With households
and communities no longer able to depend on mine jobs
and mine remittances, people migrate informally to work
in other sectors, including commercial agriculture, domestic
work, construction, the informal sector and illicit mining.

ans (eight other countries), and the rest in six or seven other

The decline of migrant mineworkers from neighbouring

countries. Notably, given the common perception that South

countries has led to:

Africa is only a destination country, there are 107,000 South
Africans in other countries in the region. In practice, this

•

means that all countries should have a vested interest in
addressing both inward and outward migration.

A decline in remittance flows to these areas from the
mines;

•

New forms of migration among former mineworkers
including their participation in dangerous but lucrative
illicit mining in abandoned mines; and

Contract Mine Migration

•

Internal and informal cross-border migration by young

Historically, the major form of labour migration in South-

workseekers, including increasing numbers of women,

ern Africa has been legal contract migration to the South

from these areas in search of non-mine employment.

African and Zimbabwean gold and coal mines, the Zambian

TABLE 2: SADC MIGRANTS IN OTHER SADC COUNTRIES, 2015
As Origin

As Destination

Net Migration

Mozambique

616,945

135,586

-481,359

Zimbabwe

602,844

249,789

-353,055

Lesotho

362,000

3,040

-358,960

Malawi

280,077

153,189

-126,888

Angola

271,838

51,981

-219,857

DRC

195,946

185,205

-10,741

Zambia

164,033

75,683

-88,350

Namibia

138,353

63,206

-75,147

South Africa

107,029

1,803,163

+1,696,134

Swaziland

92,232

23,450

-68,782

Botswana

51,832

105,998

+54,166

Tanzania

35,891

92,782

+56,891

4,182

n/a

n/a

11,856

3,023

+8,833

1,530

1,614

-84

Madagascar
Mauritius
Seychelles

Source: United Nations Population Division (2015). Data retrieved on June 10, 2016 from http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/
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The economic challenges include rising unemployment

misinformation in South Africa’s new Green Paper clarifies

and the creation of alternative job opportunities for young

that this actually refers to the cumulative number of asy-

workseekers. There is little evidence that the supplier govern-

lum applications received over time and that the number

ments have seriously addressed these challenges. In Lesotho,

of currently active applications for asylum is only 78,000.9

this may be because the growth of the textile industry has

The number of new asylum-seekers did increase dramati-

ameliorated the overall impact by providing employment to

cally after 2000, peaking in South Africa at 222,000 in 2009

over 50,000 women.

(Table 3). Since 2012, the number of asylum-seekers has been
around 60,000-70,000 per annum. The main countries of
origin in 2015 were Zimbabwe (10,854), Ethiopia (9,322),

Refugee Migration

Nigeria (6,554), DRC (6,355), Bangladesh (3,290), Pakistan
(2,448), Malawi (2,372), India (1,728), Somalia (1,582) and

The number of forced migrants within Southern Africa
peaked at 1.8 million in 1992. The numbers have declined
in the last 20 years to their present level of 142,000 (mostly
from the DRC) (Figure 1). Less than 10% of the region’s total
migrant stock therefore comprises refugees from within the
region. The number of refugees from crisis states in Africa
outside the region has also declined, peaking in the late
1990s at around 700,000 and declining to less than 100,000
in 2012 (Figure 2). Most countries have seen a decline in
their refugee population although South Africa’s has slowly

Ghana (1,778).10
For the past decade, asylum-seeking has been dominated by
migrants from Zimbabwe, with as many as 80% of asylumseekers in 2011, and 44% overall between 2002 and 2015.
There is disagreement over how many asylum-seekers are
refugees and how many are economic migrants. The South
African government has claimed that 90% are economic
migrants, while some researchers put the figure at only
50%.11

increased over the last decade to its current level (2015) of

On the basis of the 90% claim, South Africa’s new Green

110,000 (mainly from African countries such as Somalia,

Paper proposes a controversial overhaul of the refugee pro-

Ethiopia and the Great Lakes region).

tection system which would make it far more difficult for

Governments are known to cite asylum-seeker figures to
build a case that they are being inundated by refugees. The
South African government has often claimed that it has over

migrants to claim asylum, remove their right to pursue an
economic livelihood, and confine asylum-seekers to “reception centres” until their cases are adjudicated.

1 million asylum-seekers in the country.8 A corrective to this

FIGURE 1: TOTAL NUMBER OF REFUGEES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA FROM OTHER SOUTHERN
AFRICAN COUNTRIES, 1970-2014
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SAMP • 11

HARNESSING MIGRATION FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

FIGURE 2: TOTAL NUMBER OF REFUGEES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA FROM OUTSIDE SOUTHERN
AFRICA, 1985-2014
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TABLE 3: ASYLUM APPLICATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA, 2002-2015
Year

Total

Zimbabweans

% Zimbabwean

2002

55,426

115

0.2

2003

35,920

2,588

7.2

2004

32,565

5,789

17.8

2005

28,522

7,783

27.3

2006

53,361

18,973

35.6

2007

45,637

17,667

38.7

2008

207,206

111,968

54.0

2009

222,324

149,453

67.2

2010

180,637

146,566

81.1

2011

106,904

51,031

47.7

2012

117,187

20,842

17.8

2013

79,325

16,670

21.0

2014

84,174

20,405

24.2

2015

76,110

17,785

23.4

Total

1,325,298

587,635

44.3

Source: Source: UNHCR Population Statistics. Data retrieved on 15 July 2016 from http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/time_series
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Increased Intra-Regional Mobility

is circular in character with migrants retaining strong eco-

Greater regional integration has led to a dramatic increase in

Data from the South African Census 2011 is illustrative of

short-term cross-border movement within Southern Africa
in the past two decades and this is likely to continue. Most
border-crossers are issued with visitor, tourist or business

nomic and emotional ties with the home country.14

the growing heterogeneity of migrant streams:15
•

Other SADC countries are the dominant source of

permits at the point of entry. Some countries issue short-

migrants to South Africa (68%) but there are increasing

term multiple-entry “border passes” and some permits allow

numbers of South-South migrants from the rest of Africa

multiple entry. The most important reasons for temporary

(7%) and from Asia (5%);

movement include: (a) cross-border shopping; (b) informal
cross-border informal trade (ICBT) where goods are pur-

•

all migrants are of prime working-age (25-44) while 12%

chased in one country for sale in the home country; (c)

are over the age of 55 and 18% are youth aged 15-24.

formal business; (d) tourism; (e) visiting friends and relatives;

The migration of unaccompanied minors and increased

and (e) medical migration. While short-term border cross-

family migration accounts for the 9% of migrant children

ing for these purposes is not generally classified as a form of

under the age of 14;

migration, this conclusion needs to be qualified in Southern
Africa. First, transactional data on border-crossing includes
many migrants who use visitor and other permits to enter

•

Income levels vary significantly with roughly half of all
migrants in the lowest two income quintiles, 34% in the

legally into another country. Second, certain categories,

middle-income quintile and 14% in the upper quintiles;

such as informal traders, can be viewed as circular migrants

and

because they move with great frequency and may cumulatively be away from their home country for an extended

The migrant population pyramid shows that only half of

•

The educational levels of migrants varies considerably.
Over 60% of migrants from other SADC countries have

period during the year.

only some secondary school education or less (Figure 3). Around 30% have completed secondary school

Mixed Migration

with 10% having post-secondary qualifications. Over
50% of migrants from the rest of Africa have completed

The term mixed migration is increasingly used by the IOM,

secondary school with 25% holding a post-secondary

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

qualification.

and governments to suggest that forced (refugee) migrants
and economic (“illegal” or “irregular”) migrants use the
same migration corridors and are indistinguishable from

Informal Migration

one another. To define mixed migration in this dualistic
way fails to capture the complexity of migrant movements

Informal migration (sometimes called irregular or undocu-

in Southern Africa. A more appropriate and inclusive defini-

mented migration) occurs primarily because most Southern

tion should move beyond the legal status of migrants, as

African countries do not provide work permits to semi-skilled

defined by states, to consider all aspects of the migration

and low-skilled migrants from other countries. This has the

process.12 Migration streams from one country to another

potential to change if the proposals in the new South African

within Southern Africa are increasingly heterogeneous,

Green Paper are implemented. Migration in Southern Africa

encompassing diverse motives and reasons for migration,

has become increasingly informal and unregulated, with a

different forms of cross-border movement, various legal and

growing proportion of economic migrants moving across

extra-legal categories and diverse migrant characteristics.

borders and adopting a wide variety of practices to legalize

However, the major change in migration patterns in the

their movement or to manipulate existing systems of control

past 20 years has been a significant increase in cross-border

and enforcement. These include:

movement for livelihood reasons.

•

Entering another country legally on visitor’s permits and

This is particularly evident in the case of migration from

then finding work, either letting the permit expire or

Zimbabwe, which has seen an upsurge in migrants of all ages

returning home regularly to renew the permit;

and skills levels.

13

Although some migration is long-term

or permanent, most is not with the intention of settling
in the destination country. As in the past, much migration

•

Entering into informal agreements with employers and
labour brokers to bring them into a country to work for
a set period and then return home;
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FIGURE 3: EDUCATION LEVELS OF MIGRANTS IN SOUTH AFRICA
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•

•

Obtaining an asylum-seeker permit on arrival which

Laissez faire approach, which implicitly recognizes the
advantages to employers of hiring migrants without offi-

ing South Africa, entitle the holder to work;

cial work permits and/or lacks the capacity to manage
this form of migration;

Clandestine border-crossing without proper documentation, a strategy that is used mostly by those who cannot

•

•

legalizes stay in another country and can, in cases includ-

•

Punitive approach involving arrest and deportation,

afford passports but can involve significant costs in pay-

which has been the dominant policy response in Bot-

ing guides and bribes to officials; and

swana and South Africa. South Africa has deported 2.3
million migrants since 2000, over 98% to other countries

Obtaining false documentation from individuals, often

in the Southern African region, at considerable cost to

state officials, willing to supply it.

the state, with disruption and abuse of migrants, and
with little discernible effect on migration flows;17

The number of migrants in each of these categories is
unknown. One of the challenges of measurement and management is that most are temporary migrants who return

•

through the issue of permits to employers, such as cor-

home relatively frequently. The strength of the linkages that

porate permits issued to farmers in South Africa; and

migrants maintain with the home household, community
and country therefore directly affects whether, and to what

Managerial approach, which seeks to manage migration

•

Regularization approach, which legalizes the status of

extent, the benefits of migration flow across borders. The

migrants by offering them permanent residence or tem-

best evidence for strong linkages comes from household sur-

porary residence and work permits. In South Africa, there

veys done by the Southern African Migration Programme

have been immigration amnesties for 50,000 migrant

(SAMP) in five Southern African countries, which found

gold miners (1995); 125,000 SADC migrants (1996);

extremely regular patterns of home visits and strong links

100,000 Mozambican ex-refugees (2000) and 275,000

with countries of origin.16 Of the 4,647 migrants surveyed,

Zimbabweans (2010). Another amnesty for Lesotho

for example, nearly 90% returned home at least once a year,

migrants in South Africa is currently in progress. As many

with 67% returning several times a year, and 30% returning

as 400,000 applications were expected but only 2,500

once a month. Only 7% of migrants were away from home

had been received by the closing date.18

for longer than a year at a time.

In South Africa, regularization of the legal status of over

There is no co-ordinated policy response to informalized

500,000 migrants since the mid-1990s has meant greater

migration at the regional level. At the national level there

security and improved protection from exploitation and

are various policy responses:

deportation. However, the evidence suggests that regularized
status is used strategically by migrants who still maintain

14 • SOUTHERN AFRICAN MIGRATION PROGRAMME
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strong ties with home. Most other countries in the region

Labour Force Survey (QLFS) for 2012 shows that 15% of

tend to adopt either a punitive or laissez faire approach to

migrants were unemployed, compared to 26% of non-

unregulated migration.

migrants and 33% of internal migrants.21 Migrants’ higher
employment levels are accounted for in part by informal
work and self-employment, but some South African employ-

Occupational Profile

ers also prefer hiring migrants if they are available, claiming
they are cheaper or work harder.

Regional data on the occupational profile of migrants is not
available for the whole region. Some countries, such as Botswana, South Africa and Zambia, published their data on
the occupations of migrants at the time of the most recent
census.

An analysis of 2008 National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS)
data compared the employment sectors of South Africans
and migrants and found that with the exception of mining
(with a greater relative proportion of migrants) and services (vice-versa) there were considerable similarities (Table

The 2011 South African Census found that 63% of employed

4).22 The analysis showed that migrants are also distributed

migrants were in the formal sector and two-thirds were from

across the labour market and not confined to one or two

other Southern African countries, with 10% from Europe,

sectors. Finally, a comparison with QLFS 2012 data suggests

7% from other African countries and 6% from Asia. Unusu-

a major decline in mining employment (as anticipated) and

ally in international terms, migrants to South Africa appear

increase in wholesale and retail, construction and agricul-

to have a lower unemployment rate than people born in

tural employment among migrants.23

19

the country. Census 2011 recorded that 63% of migrants
in South Africa were employed, 17% were unemployed and
20% were not economically active.20 Data from the Quarterly

A similar pattern of broad distribution of migrant occupations emerges in the occupational profile of the employed

TABLE 4: EMPLOYMENT SECTORS OF MIGRANTS AND SOUTH AFRICAN CITIZENS
NIDS (2008)

QLFS (2012)

Local (%)

Migrant (%)

Migrant (%)

Mining and quarrying

4

15

4

Wholesale and retail

13

14

28

Manufacturing

15

13

11

Services

23

13

13

Financial

11

11

9

Private households

9

10

12

Construction

5

6

12

Agriculture

7

4

8

Transport

4

2

3

Utilities

1

1

0

Source: Budlender (2013); Fauvelle-Aymar (2014)

TABLE 5: OCCUPATIONS OF MIGRANTS AND SOUTH AFRICANS
NIDS (2008)

QLFS 2012

Local (%)

Migrant (%)

Migrant (%)

Craft and related trade workers

14

33

22

Professionals

13

17

6

Low-skilled elementary

21

15

22

Clerks

11

10

4

Service and sales workers

13

9

16

Plant and machinery operators

10

8

5

Technicians and associated

5

4

7

Skilled agricultural

5

2

1

Legislators/managers/senior officials

6

1

11

Domestic workers

7

Source: Budlender (2013); Fauvelle-Aymar (2014)
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migrant population with, again, several shifts between 2008

Because of the prevalence of overland travel, migration

and 2012 with a greater proportion of migrants in less-skilled

routes tend to follow major transportation arteries. Migrants

jobs (Table 5).

who live far from these arteries first make their way to the

Published data from the Zambian 2011 Census lists the top
10 occupations of migrants and shows that at least a third
were in skilled job categories (Figure 4).24 Another quarter
were involved in agricultural production as farmers and
workers. A more recent study has shown that Zambia is a
popular destination for Chinese workers employed by Chinese companies on major infrastructural projects.25

nearest centre on the artery where they join the flows of
people leaving and returning. Destinations tend to be determined by where work or other economic opportunities are
seen as most promising. Small towns and farms along a
migration corridor are common temporary stopping points.
Migrants moving to South Africa tend to go mainly to Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape. Social networks
are exercising an increasingly strong influence on migrant
destinations.

Migration Corridors

Major migration corridors include:

Unlike the migration corridors that connect the countries

•

Zimbabwe (Harare) through Beitbridge to farms in Limpopo, to Gauteng (Johannesburg) and to the Western

of South East Asia to the Gulf, most migrants in Southern

Cape (Cape Town);

Africa travel overland and generally do so independently.
The transaction costs associated with migration therefore

•

Southern Zimbabwe (Bulawayo) through Plumtree to

tend to be much lower in this region and the high degrees

Botswana (Francistown and Gaborone). Some onward

of migration-related indebtedness in Asia are not seen in

migration occurs from Botswana to South Africa;

Southern Africa. However, migration is not a cost-neutral
exercise and involves transportation costs, documenta-

•

Southern Mozambique (rural and Maputo) through

tion fees (passports and visas), the costs of border-crossing

Ressano Garcia to farms in Mpumalanga, to Gauteng

(legal and clandestine) and the various financial demands

(Johannesburg and Pretoria) and the gold and platinum

of remaining a migrant (including fees for permit renewal,

mines; and

bribes and protection money).

FIGURE 4: TOP TEN MIGRANT OCCUPATIONS IN ZAMBIA
19.8

Subsistence agricultural and fishery workers
Shop salespersons and demonstrators

6.0

Main occupation category

Stall and market salespersons

5.4

General managers

5.1

Market gardeners and crop growers

5.0

Directors and chief executives
Architects, engineers and related professionals

4.1
3.5

Health professionals (except nursing)

3.1

Agricultural, fishery and related labourers

3.1

Business professionals

Source: Central Statistical Office (2013)
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Lesotho (rural and Maseru) through Maseru Bridge to

Most countries in Southern Africa issue temporary work

farms and mines in the Free State, farms in the Western

permits to skilled migrants from inside and outside the

Cape and KwaZulu-Natal and to Bloemfontein and Gaut-

region, provided that employers can demonstrate that no

eng (Johannesburg) for domestic workers.

local can do the job. None operate a points system and
most are unlikely to issue permanent immigration status.
There is actually a major disjuncture between independent

MIGRATION TO SOUTHERN
AFRICA

assessments of skills shortages and the heavily bureaucratic
mechanisms in place in most countries to control the import
of skills. This is particularly evident in the health sector
where skills import is not seen as a viable solution to the

For much of the 20th century, Southern Africa was a sig-

shortage of health professionals.

nificant destination for immigrants from Europe. After
independence, most countries abandoned these colonial

Comprehensive regional data on skills migration is cur-

policies. Permanent immigration from Europe was also

rently unavailable. Data that does exist suggests that most

largely abandoned by South Africa after 1994 and it joined

skilled migrants in Southern Africa come from outside the

the other countries of the region in rejecting immigration

region. South Africa, for example, issued 96,000 work per-

policies as a way to attract skilled migrants. In 2014, for

mits between 2011 and 2014. In 2014, around a quarter went

example, South Africa issued only 4,136 permanent residence

to Zimbabweans but no other Southern African states are in

permits of which only 30% (1,228) were work-related. Eco-

the top 10 origin countries (Figure 5).27 The majority of Bot-

nomic migration from the rest of Africa, as well as Asia, has

swana’s 20,000 work permit holders are from neighbouring

increased significantly in the last two decades. A quarter of

Zimbabwe and South Africa (Figure 6). In the case of Zambia,

all migrants in Southern Africa are now from African coun-

the picture is somewhat different with the majority of work

tries outside the region (Table 6). A further 2% are from Asia

permits issued to migrants from China and India.28

26

but the numbers are increasing rapidly. The majority of the
7% of migrants from Europe are a legacy from an earlier era

MIGRATION FROM SOUTHERN
AFRICA

when the government recruited immigrants from Europe to
add to the white population.
The fact that one-third of migrants in the Southern African
region are not from the region raises two pertinent ques-

There is a common perception that migration in Southern

tions: (a) is the historical legacy of colonialism and apartheid

Africa largely occurs within and to the region. It is therefore

acting as a disincentive for SADC countries to fully engage

important to emphasize that there has been significant out-

with and compete on an increasingly global market for skills?

migration from Southern Africa. Although comprehensive

and (b) should the SADC be trying to build a regional policy

data for every country is not available, there is abundant

that gives preference to intra-regional migrants and excludes

evidence that the region has experienced a major “brain

migrants from other African regions or should it rather be

drain” of skills in the past two decades and that this is

co-operating with other regions to pursue and implement an

ongoing. Recent surveys, particularly in the health sector,

Africa-wide agenda under AU direction?

show extreme levels of dissatisfaction and a high emigration
potential among health professionals.29 If these push factors

TABLE 6: REGION OF ORIGIN OF MIGRANTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, 2015
No.

%

Southern Africa

2,840,331

65.6

East, West and Central Africa

1,090,733

25.2

284,919

6.6

Asia

68,158

1.6

North Africa and Middle East

18,376

0.4

North America

Europe

15,982

0.3

Oceania

5,298

0.1

South America

3,950

0.1

Source: United Nations Population Division (2015). Data retrieved on June 10, 2016 from http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/
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FIGURE 5: COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF NEW WORK PERMIT HOLDERS IN SOUTH AFRICA, 2014
N=24,027
Other (22.0)
Zimbabwe (24.2)

Ghana (1.5)
Thailand (1.6)
Germany (1.7)
UK (1.9)
Bangladesh (3.7)
China (17.2)
Nigeria (5.0)
Pakistan (7.7)
India (13.4)
Source: Documented Immigrants in South Africa 2014 (Pretoria: Statistics South Africa, 2015).

FIGURE 6: COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF WORK PERMIT HOLDERS IN BOTSWANA, 2012

Percentage of work permit holders

50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
South
Africa
Employees

ZimbaZambia Malawi Ghana
bwe

Other
Africa

Other
British
Europe

Indian
subcontinent

China

Other
Asia

Other
countries

Not
stated

8.4

44.0

3.2

1.6

0.3

4.2

1.0

1.3

2.5

30.8

1.5

1.2

0.0

Self-employed

17.9

14.8

2.7

0.7

0.5

9.1

3.1

2.8

16.6

19.7

10.5

1.7

0.0

Overall

11.9

33.4

3.0

1.3

0.3

6.0

1.7

1.9

7.6

26.8

4.7

1.4

0.0

Country of origin
Source: Statistics Botswana, Work Permits Holders, Third Quarter 2012 (Gaborone, 2014)
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Percentage

FIGURE 7: COUNTRY OF ORIGIN OF WORK PERMIT HOLDERS IN ZAMBIA, 2009-2012
16,000

United States

14,000

United Kingdom

12,000

Zimbabwe
South Africa
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Other

4,000
2,000
0
2009

2010

2011

2012
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are not addressed by governments, the drain of skills from

(380,000), Angola (238,000), the DRC (211,000), Mauri-

the region is very likely to continue.

tius (151,000), Madagascar (134,000), Tanzania (121,000),
Mozambique (85,000) and Zambia (74,000). This suggests

The movement of migrants out of the region is so volumi-

that most Southern African countries have an interest in

nous that 53% (or 6.0 million people) of the total number

diaspora engagement for development. In terms of the

of Southern African migrants are outside the region (Table

geographical spread of the SADC diaspora, the greatest con-

7). This means that there are more Southern African migrants

centration is in the UK, followed by Australia, France, the

outside than inside the region, with 1.2 million (21%) in

US, Portugal, Canada, New Zealand, the Netherlands and

Europe, 1.1 million (19%) in East and Central Africa, 374,000

Germany.

(6%) in North America and 309,000 (5%) in Oceania. This
has considerable implications for migration and develop-

The major diaspora migration corridors are South Africa to

ment policies which align with global and African advocacy

the UK and Australia, followed by Angola to Portugal, Zim-

of the role of diasporas in African development.

babwe to the UK, Madagascar to France and South Africa to
the US. In total, there are 10 bilateral diaspora corridors with

With the exception of the BLS states (Botswana, Lesotho
and Swaziland) and Namibia, all of the SADC countries have
sizable diasporas outside the continent. The South African
diaspora is the largest (at 730,000), followed by Zimbabwe

more than 45,000 migrants from Southern Africa, again suggesting that a broader regional diaspora migration policy or
set of policies would be a productive way forward.

TABLE 7: DESTINATION OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN MIGRANTS, 2015
No.

%

Southern Africa

2,840,331

47.0

Europe

1,240,557

20.5

Rest of Africa

1,172,778

19.4

North America

374,295

6.2

Oceania

308,706

5.1

South America

69,201

1.1

North Africa and Middle East

15,600

0.3

Asia

10,573

0.2

West Africa

8,992

0.1

6,041,033

100.0
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TABLE 8: DIASPORA ORIGINS AND LOCATIONS, 2015
Diaspora Origins

No.

Diaspora Locations

No.

South Africa

731,416

United Kingdom

540,915

Zimbabwe

379,448

Australia

275,774

Angola

237,947

France

271,896

DRC

211,060

United States

242,340

Mauritius

151,340

Portugal

233,904

Madagascar

133,807

Canada

132,553

Tanzania

121,466

New Zealand

66,283

Mozambique

85,023

Netherlands

30,071

Zambia

73,817

Germany

29,612

Malawi

21,634

Seychelles

10,219

Namibia

7,133

Botswana

6,514

Swaziland

3,440

Lesotho

1,569

TABLE 9: MAJOR DIASPORA CORRIDORS, 2015
Diaspora Corridor

No.

South Africa-UK

218,732

South Africa-Australia

183,370

Angola-Portugal

151,273

Zimbabwe-UK

132,942

Madagascar-France

120,400

South Africa-US

88,907

DRC-France

76,723

Mozambique-Portugal

67,991

Zimbabwe-US

50,001

South Africa-Canada

47,182

HARNESSING MIGRATION FOR
DEVELOPMENT
There is a large and varied international literature on the
subject of harnessing migration for development and
inclusive growth. Many of these possible areas of intervention have been debated at length in international forums
such as the Global Forum on Migration and Development
(GFMD).30 Rather than providing a comprehensive overview
of all aspects of the migration and development nexus, here
we focus only on those that provide particularly promising opportunities for programming in Southern Africa. The
information and discussion that follows provides a background to the recommendations in Section 5.

Gender and Migration
Southern Africa is generally seen as a region undergoing rapid
feminization of migration with female migrants increasing
in numbers and as a proportion of the total.31 Migrant stock
data confirms the first observation but not the second (Table
10). Between 1990 and 2015, the number of female migrants
in the SADC increased by several hundred thousand to 2.25
million. However, the proportion of female migrants actually
declined over the same period from 46% to 43% of the total
and the proportion of male migrants increased from 54% to
57%. In the major destination country (South Africa), the
proportion of female migrants increased marginally from
38% to 40% but migration remained male-dominated (with
60% of the migrant stock being male). In 1990, there were
more male than female migrants in 11 SADC countries; in
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TABLE 10: PROPORTION OF MALE AND FEMALE MIGRANTS
1990

2015

Female

Male

Female

Male

Angola

46

54

52

48

Botswana

40

60

45

55

DRC

50

50

45

55

Lesotho

48

52

46

54

Madagascar

44

56

43

57

Malawi

52

48

52

48

Mauritius

51

49

45

55

Mozambique

46

54

52

48

Namibia

47

53

46

54

Seychelles

41

59

30

70

South Africa

38

62

40

60

Swaziland

46

54

48

52

Tanzania

51

49

50

50

Zambia

49

51

50

50

Zimbabwe

44

56

43

57

Total

46

54

43

57

Source: United Nations Population Division (2015). Data retrieved on June 25, 2016 from http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/

2015, the number was still 10 (with only Angola having

woman had only a 56% probability of being employed com-

shifted).

pared to a migrant man.32 This requires further multivariate

A second critical component of the feminization of migration is increased independent migration by women of all
ages, educational backgrounds and skills levels. Unfortu-

analysis by country of origin, migration category, date of
arrival and geographical location for meaningful explanation
beyond general gender discrimination.

nately, with existing gender-neutral data sets, it is difficult to
amplify this point. For example, South Africa’s Department
of Home Affairs releases data on the number of permanent
and temporary residence permits granted each year, but this
provides only country of origin and age breakdowns and not
the sex of permit-holders. Given the employment, capital,
education and skills criteria for most of the official residence
and work permit categories in South Africa, we can reasonably assume a male bias in determining eligibility, meaning
a likely male majority in legal residence and work-permitholders. For obvious reasons, no accurate count or gender
breakdown is available for informal migrants, who make
up a significant but unknown proportion of total migrant
numbers. There seems to be a persistent pattern of male
domination in current refugee and asylum-seeker flows. In
2015, males represented 67% of the country’s asylum claimants, females 33%.

Migrant Rights and Protections
Legal temporary work programmes are advocated internationally as a “triple development win” for countries of
origin, countries of destination and migrants themselves.33
Some countries, such as South Africa, have implemented
bilateral temporary work programmes with other developing
countries such as Cuba, Tunisia and India to import skilled
migrants, especially in the health sector.34 Mauritius has
imported temporary workers from Bangladesh, India and
China to work in construction and manufacturing.35 Various
countries have facilitated the temporary import of Chinese
workers as part of major China-funded construction projects.36 With the major exception of Mauritius, few Southern
African countries have taken advantage of the opportunities created by temporary work programmes in the North.37

There is limited gender-based data or analysis of migrant

These various bilateral temporary work initiatives, involving

labour and employment, but the South African indications

connections with other parts of the world, have not been

are that migrant women are more likely to be unemployed

systematically evaluated from the perspective of their posi-

than migrant men. Data from the Quarterly Labour Force

tive or negative development impacts.

Survey for the third quarter of 2012 suggests that a migrant
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Within Southern Africa, the only significant temporary work

The potentially highly exploitative institutional mecha-

programme (now in decline) is the contract labour system

nisms, both formal and informal, that connect employers to

to the South African mines. Prior to 2002, the mining com-

source areas for migrants are largely unknown and unregu-

panies could recruit and employ as many foreign miners as

lated. As Kiwanuka et al conclude, “much more research is

they wished. This changed in 2002 with South Africa’s new

needed on the informal aspects of [women’s] labour migra-

Immigration Act which obliged the mines to apply for new

tion, which point to the presence of multiple dynamics and

corporate permits to employ foreign migrants. This system

actors including locally based transnational networks of

proved cumbersome and the mines stopped employing new

recruitment and migration, informal agencies and aspects

migrants from outside the country. Commercial farmers are

of indebtedness.”42 Female migrant workers in commercial

thought to have been major users of the corporate permit

agriculture and domestic service face “nearly impossible bar-

system to legalize their employment of migrants but there

riers in accessing a legal right to work.” This means that

is no information available on the corporate permit system.

their legal situation is precarious and they are constantly

There is a growing body of case-study evidence on informal temporary migration and the low wage regime and
exploitative conditions in sectors such as construction, illicit
mining, commercial agriculture and domestic work. For
those migrant women who are employed, many are engaged
in precarious livelihoods. Some are employed in potentially
exploitative conditions with weak oversight or protection

vulnerable to arrest and deportation and to exploitation
by employers that they are powerless to report and seek
redress. The treatment of migrants travelling to and from
places of work is largely unaddressed at a regional level (not
just in South Africa), although the negative experiences of
girl migrants in three countries have been identified by Save
the Children.43

of their labour rights, for example as domestic workers38 or

One of the major challenges confronting migrants is access

farm workers.39 Others are engaged in inherently precari-

to formal social protection programmes in countries of des-

ous informal occupations such as trading, hair braiding and

tination and, to a lesser degree, the portability of eligible

other beauty services, or craft production and sales, often

social benefits across borders. Olivier has argued that “the

conducted in unsafe spaces.40 Related to their precarious

constitutional and fundamental rights protection informing

working and living conditions, female migrants experience

the social security position of intra-SADC migrants is weak

gender-based violence and other health vulnerabilities. This

and unsatisfactory.”44 Another study has highlighted the

is particularly acute for those who engage in sex work: a 2010

absence of good nationally representative data on migrant

survey of female sex workers in Johannesburg, Rustenburg

social protection and portability.45 Much recent attention

and Cape Town found that 46% were migrants.41

has been focused on the question of the portability of rights

Women and girls tend to be concentrated in the commercial,
agriculture and domestic work sectors. It is clear that the
poor treatment of regional migrants on the way to and at the
workplace has an extremely negative impact on the migrants
themselves and their households, but this is also antithetical
to development and inclusive growth in their home coun-

for migrant miners. Given the imminent demise of foreign
migrant labour on the mines, however, the social protection
challenge relates more to redressing the negative legacies
of the system. Two legacies of mine migration are being
addressed by various stakeholders:
•

Unpaid social security benefits in the form of provident

tries. For example, low wages and other forms of financial

and pension funds amounting to over ZAR4.0 billion

extortion severely reduce the remitting ability of migrants.

owed to at least 200,000 ex-mineworkers;46 and

Employers of domestic and agricultural workers have been
found to deny migrants their basic labour rights, engage in
exploitative labour practices such as low pay, withholding
wages, excessively long hours, poor accommodation and
dangerous working conditions. Poor conditions and abuse at
the workplace go unpunished when reporting to the authorities is likely to lead to arrest as an “illegal foreigner”, job loss
and deportation. Precarious employment in the agricultural
and domestic service sectors is highly gendered with female
migrants being most vulnerable to exploitation by formal
and informal labour brokers and recruiters, employers and
the police.
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•

The human and financial cost of the health burden on
neighbouring countries from occupational disease.47
In May 2016, the South African High Court allowed a
class-action lawsuit against over 25 mining companies,
which could eventually benefit as many as 300,000 exmineworkers with silicosis.48

Social security entitlements and compensation and the
settlement of lawsuits could see significant sums being transferred from South Africa to impoverished ex-mineworkers
and their families (Table 11).
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TABLE 11: SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS OWED TO EX-MINEWORKERS
Social Security Institution

Amount

Mineworkers Provident Fund

ZAR3,008,289,913

106,149

Living Hands Umbrella Trust

ZAR1,200,000,000

12,500

Mines 1970s Pension & Provident Funds

ZAR200,000,000

59,702

Sentinel Mining Industry Retirement Fund

ZAR101,000,000

Unknown

Compensation Commissioner for
Occupational Diseases

18,000 (claims backlog)
274,000 (still to be compensated)

Compensation Fund

12,000 (still to be compensated)

Migration and Remittances

•

The major remittance-sending countries in 2014 were
South Africa (at USD639 million), Zimbabwe (USD50
million), Botswana (USD48 million), and Malawi and

There is a considerable body of case-study research evidence

Mozambique (at USD31 million each);

to confirm that remitting is an extremely common practice
in Southern Africa. However, much remitting is through
informal channels, and accurate data on remittance flows

•

Botswana (USD41 million), Tanzania (USD40 million),

that the “deficit of complete and high quality data” has made

Zambia (USD37 million), Malawi (USD30 million) and

it difficult to formulate a comprehensive policy response.49
There are two main sources of data on overall cash remittance flows: (a) World Bank calculations and (b) FinMark

The major recipients were Zimbabwe (no data), Lesotho (USD426 million), Mozambique (USD128 million),

at the regional level is not available. FinMark Trust observes

Swaziland (USD23 million);
•

The main remittance corridors are South Africa-Zimbabwe (no data), South Africa-Lesotho (USD414 million),

Trust estimates. In this report, we relied on World Bank data,

South Africa-Mozambique (USD90 million), South Africa-

which provides a more comprehensive picture of bilateral

Botswana (USD38 million) and Botswana-South Africa

flows across the region (Table 12):
•

No. of Beneficiaries

(USD33 million);

There has been a consistent increase in total global remittance flows to the countries of Southern Africa from
USD200 million in 1995 to USD1 billion in 2014;

•

Significantly, only a third (31%) of remittances to Southern African countries come from other countries within
the region. Over two-thirds (69%) of remittances to

TABLE 12: REMITTANCE FLOWS WITHIN AND TO SOUTHERN AFRICA (USD MILLION)
Total remittances
sent
Angola
Botswana

Total remittances
received

Intra-regional
remittances
received

Extra-regional
remittances
received

Regional as percentage of total

6

11

5

6

45.4

48

45

41

4

91.1

DRC

3

22

3

19

13.6

Lesotho

1

430

426

4

99.1

Madagascar
Malawi
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Seychelles
South Africa

0

427

8

419

18.7

35

38

30

8

78.9

1

249

15

235

6.0

35

161

128

33

79.5

9

10

9

1

90.0

3

17

1

16

5.9

639

866

91

775

10.5

Swaziland

12

24

23

1

95.8

Tanzania

15

389

40

349

10.3

Zambia
Zimbabwe
Regional total

4

58

37

21

63.8

50

–

–

–

n/a

861

2,747

857

1,890

31.2

Source: http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data
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•

Southern African countries therefore come from outside

In much of the discussion about remittances and develop-

the region; and

ment, the fact that migrants remit goods as well as cash is
ignored. However, research suggests that this is an important

There are differences among countries in the proportion

aspect of remitting in Southern Africa. Just over one-third

of remittances received from other countries in Southern

of the households in a five-country SAMP survey had also

Africa versus the proportion that comes from outside the

received goods in the previous year (Table 13).52 Here again,

region. In some countries, over 90% of remittances are

there was considerable variation from country to country.

intra-regional (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swazi-

Goods remittances were most important to households in

land). In others, more than 80% of remittances come

Zimbabwe (68%) and Mozambique (65%) and least impor-

from outside the region (DRC, Seychelles, Mauritius,

tant to households in Lesotho (20%) and Swaziland (17%).

South Africa and Tanzania).

Although the average annual value of cash remittances was
about three times as much as goods remittances, in Mozam-

For purposes of harnessing remittances for development and

bique they were almost the same and in Zimbabwe only

inclusive growth, both sources of remittances need to be
tapped.

twice as much. These figures suggest that goods remitting is

Table 13 refers only to remittances through formal chan-

needs more attention.

a significant component of remitting in Southern Africa that

nels. It is well documented that the majority of migrants

Globally, female migrants send approximately the same per

within the Southern African region use informal channels

capita amount of remittances as male migrants. Women tend

including personal conveyance. In some cases, especially

to send a higher proportion of their income, even though

Zimbabwe, there are specialist transporters of remittances

they generally earn less than men.53 They also usually send

who run small businesses in this sector. While increased

money more regularly and for longer periods of time. By

use of formal channels is a desirable objective of banks and

sending smaller sums more often, women also tend to

money transfer companies, and a fundamental aim of the

spend more on transfer fees. While men mostly remit to

World Bank, it needs to be established whether migrants use

their partners, women often send remittances to the per-

informal channels out of choice or necessity and what the

son (often another woman) taking care of her children to

impacts of formalization would be on informal operators,
many of whom are themselves migrants.

ensure that the money is spent on the children. Research by

One reason migrants may avoid formal channels is the cost

in Southern Africa with distinct gender differences in remit-

of remitting in Southern Africa, among the highest globally.

ting amounts, frequency and means of remitting, remittance

The global average cost of sending remittances was 7.5% of

recipients and use of remittances. This evidence suggests that

the amount received. In South Africa, the average was more

data, research and policy-making on migration needs to be

than double the global average at 15.2%. Considerable work

gender-disaggregated.

SAMP showed that many of these general patterns prevailed

in reducing remittance costs has been done by FinMark Trust
in trying to resolve what it calls the “problem of informalisa-

Migration and Informal
Entrepreneurship

tion”; that is, the preference of remitters to utilize informal
channels and the exclusionary practices of financial institutions.50 Significant changes in the regulatory environment
and technological advances now provide platforms for more

The numbers of migrants running small and micro-enter-

efficient and cost-effective money transfer services, which

prises or being employed in these businesses is considerable

may prompt a shift towards greater formalization and finan-

in towns and cities across the region. In South Africa, as

cial inclusion.51

many as one-third of migrants are self-employed in the
informal economy. The Gauteng City-Region Observatory

TABLE 13: INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNAL GOODS REMITTING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, 2008
International migrants

Internal migrants

% receiving cash remittances

68

44

% receiving goods remittances

36

19

Mean cash remittances

ZAR4,821

ZAR5,434

Mean value of goods remittances

ZAR1,702

ZAR2,004

88

85

Importance to survival (%)
Source: SAMP
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(GCRO) Quality of Life Survey 2013 found that 11% of

The major challenges to business survival and expansion

Johannesburg residents owned their own business and 65%

include (a) difficulties of securing start-up capital and con-

of all business owners operated in the informal economy.

sequent reliance on personal savings; (b) problems securing

Around 20% of informal business owners were migrants

business loans from formal financial institutions, especially

from another country.54 The ILO definition of the informal

banks; (c) lack of basic business training and skills; (d) exclu-

economy encompasses precarious employment including

sion from the formal banking system and business banking,

those who are employed and self-employed in the informal

thus increasing vulnerability to crime; (e) direct competition

sector and also those who are working unpaid in a house-

from formal businesses especially supermarkets; (f) vulner-

hold business and working in a job that does not entitle

ability to xenophobic attacks and destruction of stock and

them to employment benefits. Under this definition, the

business premises; and (g) a hostile operating environment

proportion of migrants working in the informal economy

including official harassment, extortion and demands for

rises to 53% in South Africa.55 Recent case studies in South

bribes or protection money.

African cities provide various insights into the nature of
informal self-employment.
Recent surveys of over 1,000 informal business owners in
Cape Town and Johannesburg (Table 9) showed that:
•

Diasporas for Development
As noted above, all of the countries of Southern Africa have

In both cities, 30% of those running informal enterprises

sizable diasporas living outside the country. The African

were women;

Union and many individual countries increasingly recognize
the diaspora as an important actual and potential develop-

•

•

Many entrepreneurs were young (virtually all under the

ment resource for remittances, investments, philanthropy,

age of 50 and 70-80% under the age of 40);

tourism, training and skills transfer. While the SADC Secre-

Informal migrant entrepreneurs come from a wide variety
of countries inside and outside Southern Africa. The pattern was slightly different in the two cities: Zimbabweans
predominated in both but Somalis and Ethiopians were
more common in Cape Town than Johannesburg (23%
versus 10%). On the other hand, entrepreneurs from
Mozambique and Lesotho were more common in Johannesburg (19% versus 2%);

•

tariat has not articulated a policy for diaspora engagement
at the regional level, many individual governments are
developing plans and policies for diaspora engagement. An
important information gap concerns the attitudes of diasporas themselves to engagement in development-related
activities and initiatives in their countries of origin. There
are four key questions: (a) what kinds of backward linkages,
if any, do migrants maintain with their countries of origin?
(b) what interest do they have in leveraging these linkages

The occupational distribution was similar in both cities

for development purposes? (c) what kinds of development-

with trade dominant in both (at around 60%); and

related activities are diasporas interested in and capable of
initiating and supporting? and (d) are they prepared to work

•

The vast majority in both cities had a legal right to be in

with governments and respond to government diaspora

the country with only about 10% undocumented.56

engagement policies or do they prefer to work outside gov-

Informal business owners are classified as self-employed but
they also have positive development impacts in countries

ernment channels, for example with the private and NGO
sectors?

of destination and origin through (a) remittance of busi-

Answers to these questions can only be gathered from

ness profits to home countries; (b) generating employment

research with diasporas. Two studies provide some insights

in countries of destination for migrants and citizens. In

for particular diasporas. The first is a study of the global

Cape Town, for example, 30% of migrant-owned businesses

Zambian diaspora undertaken by the IOM and the Diaspora

employ other migrants while 41% employ South Africans;57

Liaison Office of the Zambian Government in 2008 and

(c) rental of business properties from local property owners;

updated in 2014.58 The 2014 iteration reports the findings

(d) providing cheaper services, including food, and credit

from 1,200 respondents:

to poor consumers in countries of operation; (e) supporting formal sector businesses and employment generation

•

ment/business opportunities (42%) and education (38%);

through purchase of products for resale from wholesalers and
retailers; (f) payment of operating licences to municipalities;
and (g) paying VAT on purchased goods.

The primary reasons for leaving Zambia were employ-

•

As many as 70% left Zambia more than five years ago,
40% having been away for more than 10 years. Nearly

SAMP • 25

HARNESSING MIGRATION FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

•

50% return to Zambia at least once per year. Only 9%

family. Nearly all remitters (95%) send money to imme-

have never returned since leaving;

diate family members, while 10% send remittances to

manently while another 25% are unsure;
•

community groups and organizations;

Around two-thirds (69%) intend to return to Zambia per•

have participated in some kind of economic activity in

The diaspora is highly skilled with around 70% having

their country of origin: 25% have exported Canadian

graduate degrees (including 40% with post-graduate

goods for sale, 11% have invested in business, 11%

degrees) and another 20% with college qualifications;
•

have generated employment, and 10% have engaged
in research partnerships. In terms of willingness to be

Over 80% send remittances to Zambia, 44% on a

engaged in the future, only nine percent said they had

monthly basis. Most send remittances to financially sup-

no interest; and

port family or friends (94%) and personal investment
(37%). Remittances flow largely through formal channels
(banks and money transfer companies);
•

As many as 91% are interested in making private investments in Zambia, with the greatest sectoral interest in
agriculture/horticulture (47%), import (28%), manufac-

•

In terms of diaspora engagement activities, nearly 50%

•

The preferred avenues of engagement included skills
transfer (mentioned by 58%), investing in businesses
(55%), participation in development projects (52%),
educational exchanges (52%), volunteer work (48%),
fundraising for development projects (46%), philan-

turing (28%), tourism (26%) and transport (24%); and

thropy (42%), export and import of goods to and from

Nearly 60% express interest in contributing to or donat-

development (39%) and providing distance learning

ing to development projects in Zambia, with only 11%

(37%). Others specifically mentioned their desire to be

uninterested. The preferred project areas include educa-

involved in activities that would lead to greater empow-

tion (62%), healthcare (41%), infrastructure development

erment for women and children.

(31%), childcare (26%) and microfinance initiatives
(23%). Over 80% are interested in skills transfer and 41%
in making financial contributions.

the country of origin (38%), investing in infrastructural

A related study of South African philanthropists in Canada
found (a) that they preferred to work with non-governmental organizations in the education and health sectors; and

The second study by SAMP surveyed 2,450 migrants from

(b) that some were generous givers but preferred to donate

SADC countries who had immigrated to Canada:59

to Canadian causes, citing corruption and related reasons for

•

•

Only 19% of the sample entered Canada in the economic
class. The bulk of the remainder entered as asylum-

In sum, the research suggests that migrants from the South-

seekers/refugees (34%), students (18%) and family-class

ern African region have not turned their backs on their

immigrants (15%). Irrespective of the category of entry,

countries of origin and that there is considerable latent

53% had acquired Canadian citizenship;

potential for diaspora engagement in development-related

The immigrants had attained high levels of education
before coming to Canada. For example, 30% had at least
a university degree upon entry. As many as a third had to
re-certify or retrain in Canada in order to work in a field
for which they were already trained;

•

The most common occupations included sales and service, health and finance, business and banking; and

•

Almost two-thirds (62%) felt that they have an important
role to play in developing their countries of origin. Only
15% said they had no role to play;

•

not donating to South Africa.60

Nearly 70% remit money to their country of origin. Onequarter remit at least once a month, another third at
least once a year and the rest occasionally. The average
amount remitted is CAD1,000 per year. Remitting largely
consists of private funds sent to immediate and extended
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CHAPTER 4: MIGRATION
AND DEVELOPMENT AS A
REGIONAL CHALLENGE IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA
INTRODUCTION
In principle, there is significant awareness among SADC
member states about the need to strengthen efforts aimed at
harnessing migration for inclusive growth and development.
The member states of the SADC have more than a decade of
participation in international and regional forums on migration and development (including the annual Global Forum
on Migration and Development, the two UN High Level Dialogues on International Migration and the 2013 Diaspora
Ministerial Conference) as well as the Migration Dialogue
for Southern Africa (MIDSA) regional consultative process.61
Many states should be cognizant of the key modalities and
actions required to make migration work for development.
The relationship between migration and development is also

at the national level. Finally, and in that context, Section
4.7 examines the proposed new approach by South Africa
to migration management and whether this signifies a new
sensitivity to regional migration realities.

PERCEPTIONS OF MIGRATION
AS A REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
ISSUE
There was a considerable degree of unanimity among the
80 stakeholders interviewed for this study on the importance of seeing migration as a development issue requiring
a co-ordinated regional response in Southern Africa. There
was some expectation of a difference in opinion between
regional and national stakeholders. However, many of the
latter were also willing to acknowledge that migration was
not only an issue of national importance. Where they differed was on who should be driving the agenda: national
governments or regional bodies. The main points of consensus among stakeholders were the following:
•

There is a pressing need for a regional approach to migra-

clearly articulated in the AU Migration Policy Framework

tion and development in the SADC. The challenge is

and the African Common Position on Migration and Devel-

implementation;

opment. On the face of it, therefore, there are reasons to
be optimistic about a regional migration and development

•

Migration within and to the SADC region is beneficial

agenda co-ordinated by the SADC Secretariat and imple-

for economic development, poverty reduction and inclu-

mented by member states.

sive economic growth. Migration is a means of “levelling
development” and reducing economic disparities;

In practice, little progress has been made on mainstreaming migration and development at the national or regional

•

Migration to and from a country and within the SADC

policy level. Regional efforts to forge a common approach

is an asset for the development of the regional economy,

to migration appear promising, but while states appear

for poverty reduction and for inclusive economic growth.

willing to make initial commitments to agreements, instru-

However, there is a need for proper planning and man-

ments and initiatives, they are generally unwilling to ratify

agement of migration in the region in order to optimize

and implement anything that appears to infringe on their

the benefits;

national sovereignty or the interests of citizens.

•

Increased development in the region will not necessarily

This section of the report first examines the extent to which

reduce migration but could change migration patterns.

migration is recognized as a regional development issue.

It could reduce the economic reasons for migration and

Section 4.2 presents the results of the NVIVO analysis of

therefore mean less movement of unskilled labour. But

stakeholder interviews to assess the extent to which migra-

there may be an increase in migration of skilled labour

tion is seen as a regional issue and force for development.

who believe they have better opportunities elsewhere;

Section 4.3 discusses the limited success of initiatives to
advance a common regional migration agenda by the SADC

•

Secretariat. Section 4.4 provides a gender analysis of these

addressed. Greater freedom of movement of migrants for

regional initiatives. Section 4.5 examines other regional gov-

work or other economic activity within Southern Africa

ernance initiatives, including the Migration Dialogue for

would be beneficial;

Southern Africa (MIDSA) process. Section 4.6 identifies various obstacles to a regional migration management approach
in Southern Africa and highlights the importance of actions

The criminalization of migration and not offering a
legal route for migrants are challenges that need to be

•

The free movement of migrants is essential but most
states reject it as infringing on their sovereign rights;
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•

A number of respondents felt that national govern-

capacities of states to individually and collectively regu-

ments should be driving the migration and development

late migration and strengthen border management. The

agenda in the region and that it was important to move

Protocol was tabled in 2005 but by 2016 only six states

from the security focus towards an economic and devel-

(Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, South Africa, Swazi-

opment focus. However, those with a more regional brief

land and Zambia) had ratified it, short of the 10 required

said that the SADC should drive the agenda even though

for it to enter into force.

the regional body was described by some as ineffective;
and
•

The trumping of regional mobility initiatives by national
immigration policies focused on movement control is clear

Most respondents knew about some of the AU and

to experts: “The non-ratification and enforcement of the

regional protocols and agreements but none were famil-

SADC Facilitation Protocol, a much less ambitious objective

iar with all.

than its free movement predecessor, raises questions about
the region and its Member States’ political will and commit-

MIGRATION INITIATIVES AND THE
SADC SECRETARIAT
Freedom of Movement
At the regional level, there is a paucity of instruments that
focus directly on migration and development. An evaluation
of the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
(RISDP) concluded that: “It is disconcerting that the relationship between migration and poverty is under-represented in
the plan’s proposed intervention areas and only addressed
in a partial and circumscribed manner.”62

ment to migration governance.”64
SADC member states prefer to act bilaterally in their dealings
with each other on migration. This emphasis began in the
1960s and 1970s (and the 1920s in the case of Mozambique
and South Africa) when South Africa and its neighbours concluded bilateral treaties to regulate and monitor the supply
of migrant mineworkers to the South African mines. These
agreements have never been officially repealed but are outdated and largely defunct. Since 2000, South Africa and
neighbouring states have pursued new bilateral approaches
(including on migration) through Joint Permanent Commissions (JPCs) and Memoranda of Understanding.65 The
JPCs have facilitated some migration-related issues on a
bilateral basis (visa waivers, for example) but they do not

Freedom of intra-regional movement has been a principle

have explicit development-related goals. Further, it might

of SADC since its foundation, although this is not explicitly

be argued that if two states can achieve their basic goal of

tied to positive development outcomes. Article 5(2)(d) of the

achieving greater control over migration through bilateral

SADC Treaty (1992) states that the SADC shall “develop poli-

agreements, this acts as a further disincentive to implement

cies aimed at progressive elimination of obstacles to the free

multilateral instruments.

movement of capital and labour, goods and services, and of
the people of the region generally, among Member States.”
Despite this objective, unfettered free movement is very far
from being a reality. The Secretariat has had no success in
getting all member states to ratify its two major regional
mobility policy initiatives:
•

At the level of individual member states, the mandate and
expertise required for, and resources devoted to, migration
management is often limited to routine and operational
capacity requirements, as opposed to a more strategic
approach in which migration management is an essential
component of the development objectives of a particular

The 1995 Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Per-

state. An audit of Poverty Reduction Strategy Plans (PRSPs),

sons provided for members of one state to freely enter,

for example, found that “the knowledge base on migration

establish themselves and work in another state. The

and development that does exist is weakly incorporated into

Protocol was abandoned in 1998 after major opposition

poverty policy in the region.”66 The South African National

from South Africa, Botswana and Namibia;63 and

Development Plan 2030 admits that “South Africa, like most
other African countries, has done little to increase the ben-

•

The 2005 Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement

efits of migration or reduce the risks migrants face.”67

of Persons had similar provisions regarding visa-free
entry, residence and establishment, but affirmed that

Little discernible progress has therefore been made with

migration management was a national competency.

regard to the implementation of a free movement regime

While calling for the harmonization of migration poli-

by the SADC Secretariat. In part, this is because there is very

cies and legislation, it did not propose an over-arching

little data or analysis on the impact that removing border

regional migration policy and legislative framework.

controls in the region would actually have. It is arguable that

Instead, much of the protocol focuses on enhancing the

SADC is already a de facto free movement zone and that the
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removal of controls would not have a dramatic impact on

•

All of the SADC member states have now ratified some

migration flows. What it would do is provide legal channels

of the core ILO Conventions dealing with labour rights

for those who want to migrate, reduce the opportunities for

(87, 100, 111 and 182). However, there are very low rati-

personal enrichment by corrupt state functionaries on both

fication rates of others. For example, only three states

sides of borders, eliminate current high levels of corrup-

have ratified the employment policy and occupational

tion and abuse in the immigration system, and reduce the

safety and health conventions and just two states (Mau-

exploitation of migrants who enjoy few rights and protec-

ritius and South Africa) have ratified the 2011 Domestic

tions. However, free movement is likely to remain politically

Workers Convention. An assessment is needed of the

unpalatable to most states for the foreseeable future. Greater

implementation of ratified conventions as they pertain

opportunities for legal and regulated migration may there-

to migrant rights and the reasons for the low rates of rati-

fore be the best way forward in the short and medium term.68

fication of others, including those affecting key migrant
work sectors;

Migrant Rights and Protections

•

signed by Labour Ministers from all member states in
2014.71 Article 19 deals with Labour Migration and

One of the key components of inclusive growth strategies is

Migrant Workers and contains several rights-based pro-

poverty reduction through productive and decent employ-

visions, stating that member states will endeavour to:

ment. Given the high levels of poverty and inequality

(a) strengthen mechanisms to combat smuggling and

throughout Southern Africa, it is important to view migrant

human trafficking; (b) ensure that fundamental rights are

employment rights as an integral part of the inclusive growth

accorded to non-citizens, in particular labour/employ-

agenda. Our recent study for UNRISD examined the issue of

ment and social protection rights; (c) adopt measures to

migrant protection and rights in the Southern African region

provide for the special needs of migrant women, chil-

as a whole and identified the various regional-level commit-

dren and youth; (d) adopt a regional migration policy

ments to protecting migrant rights and the obstacles to their

in accordance with international conventions to ensure

implementation:69
•

The SADC Protocol on Employment and Labour was

the protection of the rights of migrants; and (e) adopt

The core international legal instrument with the poten-

measures to facilitate the co-ordination and portability

tial to protect migrants in the region is the 1990 UN

of social security benefits for migrants. Two-thirds of the

International Convention on the Protection of the Rights

SADC member states need to ratify the Protocol for it to

of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families

come into force but as of mid-2016 no states had done

(ICRMW). However, only Lesotho, Madagascar, Mozam-

so. This prompted the SADC Labour Ministers to direct

bique and Seychelles are signatories to the ICRMW. In

the SADC Secretariat, with the support of the ILO, to

Southern Africa, as is the case globally, there is consider-

conduct a study to establish the problems underlying

able resistance to this Convention;

the non-ratification of the Protocol and explore ways to

70

promote its ratification by member states. As with the
•

Within the SADC, member states are committed to

Facilitation of Movement Protocol, the Employment and

upholding fundamental human rights including employ-

Labour Protocol may well remain an aspirational docu-

ment rights as per the SADC Charter on Fundamental

ment with little concrete implementation; and

Social Rights. However, nowhere in the Charter are
migrants mentioned explicitly and no provision is made

•

•

The 2014 SADC Regional Labour Migration Policy Frame-

for the portability of rights and protections across state

work has as one of its four main aims to “strengthen

borders;

protection of the rights of migrant workers.”72 Member

The 2008 Code on Social Security deals with migrants,

states are enjoined to strive to put in place by 2019 a
national migration policy that includes explicit rights-

foreign workers and refugees in Article 17, and explicitly

based objectives. The extensive list of rights for migrants

states that member states should progressively reduce

contains two notable features: (a) it applies primarily

migration controls, that all legally employed migrants

to migrant workers in formal employment and not to

are entitled to the same social security as citizens, and

undocumented, irregular or unregulated migrant work-

that “illegal migrants” should enjoy “basic minimum

ers; and (b) it appears to apply mainly to migrants in

protection.” The Code therefore acknowledges that the

employment and not self-employment. Apart from its

rights of migrants require attention but its non-binding

non-binding character, there are several rights (especially

character makes implementation problematic;

concerning equal access and opportunity with nationals)
that member states are unlikely to implement.
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In sum, the SADC Secretariat has made various efforts to put

data collection and exchange mechanism modelled on the

in place instruments that commit member states to protect-

European example; integrating migration modules in labour

ing the rights of migrant workers. In practice, ratification

market surveys; and research, monitoring and evaluation on

and implementation are proving problematical as few mem-

irregular migration, smuggling, trafficking and IDPs.

ber states are willing to ratify the appropriate instruments.

The second component is designed to co-ordinate SouthSouth labour mobility through targeted regional policies

SADC Decent Work Programme
A current SADC initiative, in collaboration with the ILO, is
the SADC Decent Work Programme (DWP), which runs from
2013 to 2019.73 Although targeted at work and labour in general, the DWP does explicitly address migration and supports
the principle of freer movement in the region. It identifies a
“decent work deficit” as a motive for intra-regional migration
and emphasizes that “all core international labour standards apply to all workers regardless of their nationality or
immigration status, unless otherwise stated.” The DWP recognizes that increasing numbers of migrants in the region
are women and has a specific section on gender that urges
strengthened commitment to existing SADC gender policies
and protocols. It calls on SADC states to ratify and implement existing ILO Conventions and observes that most

and programmes, and standardized frameworks, mechanisms and tools. This component is motivated by the need
for an overall regional policy framework to govern labour
migration and harness the benefits of migration for sending,
transit and receiving countries. Proposed activities including
mapping regulatory frameworks for illegal employment and
informal work, with emphasis on migrant protection; consensus-building on regional migration policy priorities and
harmonising operational procedures; harmonizing national
labour and employment legislation on the rights of migrants
and aligning this to regional treaties, protocols, the ILO conventions and the AU Migration Framework; mainstreaming
migration in the regional integration agendas of the economic communities; raising public awareness on migrant
rights; and educating and providing protection to abused
migrant workers.

SADC member states have not yet ratified either the ICRMW

The third component is directed at strengthening migra-

or the ILO Domestic Workers Convention. It includes as a

tion management through policies and programmes on

planned output a SADC Protocol to Eliminate Human Traf-

irregular migration, smuggling of migrants and traffick-

ficking. Achievement of the DWP’s objectives, including

ing in migrants, refugees and internally displaced people

ratification and implementation of the various ILO and UN

(IDPs). As well as strengthening migration management,

Conventions (especially the Domestic Workers Convention)

this component is designed to strengthen law enforcement

along with the proposed anti-trafficking Protocol, could ben-

to develop and implement regional policies on trafficking;

efit migrants in the region.

develop regional and national policies to address smuggling
of migrants and unaccompanied children; develop a regional

Strengthening Institutional
Mechanisms for Migration
Management
The European Union (EU) recently funded a project to
strengthen the capacity of regional integration institutions
and organizations including the SADC, COMESA, IOC and
EAC in collaboration with the EU Delegation in Botswana
with three components: (a) monitoring of migration flows;
(b) addressing labour migration flows within Southern
Africa; and (c) addressing mixed migration flows into the
Southern Africa region. The first component is designed to

framework to manage asylum-seekers, refugees and IDPs; and
develop a regional framework for addressing disaster-induced
displacement and migration.

GENDER ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL
INITIATIVES
A gender analysis of the various AU and SADC strategic
instruments shows that gender and migration issues do feature, albeit in piecemeal fashion:
•

Gender is paid explicit attention within the AU Migra-

co-ordinate the collection of reliable data and statistics and

tion Framework: first, within the section on Labour

research for monitoring migration and border security con-

Migration; second, as an emphasis within the section

cerns. The main activities will include strengthening regional

on Migrant Smuggling; third, as a category of vulner-

capacity for data collection, analysis and use, including

able persons in the section on Forced Migration; and,

through migration profiles, to better inform national and

finally, in a separate sub-section on Migration and Gen-

regional policies; standardizing migrant stocks and flows

der under “Other Social Issues”. The AU Framework refers

data collection within member states; establishing a formal

to a number of UN and ILO Conventions and Protocols,
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including the ICRMW and Domestic Workers Conven-

The Employment and Labour Protocol references other

tion, urging their ratification and adoption by member

instruments, such as the 2008 SADC Protocol on Gen-

states. The sections on gender point to the growing

der and Development, and includes gender equity and

feminization of migration, including for labour in the

equality as specific objectives. However, the Protocol’s

care sector, but place greater emphasis on the vulner-

commitments on paper would need to be turned into

ability of female migrants to exploitation, trafficking

effective national laws and policies and practical local

and sexual slavery. Similar observations on the growing

interventions if they are to become meaningful tools to

feminization of African migration and exploitation of

protect migrant women’s rights and support their eco-

female migrants are evident in the 2006 African Com-

nomic contributions;

mon Position on Migration and Development. Women
migrants would benefit from the rights, protections and

•

tion, convergence and harmonization of social security

promotion of freer migration that are set out in the AU

provisions and laws in SADC member states. Article 13

Framework and African Common Position. Yet these

of the Code deals with “Gender” and Article 17 with

AU recommendations, while important and desirable as

“Migrants, Foreign Workers and Refugees”. The gender

goals, are weakened by being non-binding and deferring

provisions in the Code include equal access to social

to national laws and policies;
•

the social security system, abolition of discriminatory

ment and Integration in Africa (Joint Labour Migration

laws and practices, and strategies for the eradication of

Programme, or JLMP) was developed by the AU Com-

poverty and economic empowerment of women. Pro-

mission in conjunction with the ILO, IOM and UNECA.

visions for migrants are expressed in terms of different

This was formally adopted at the African Union Assembly

migrant categories. In addition to urging states to work

in 2015. Among the key features of African migration

towards regional free movement of persons, the Code

identified in the JLMP is the increased feminization of

holds that legal migrants should enjoy equal treatment

labour mobility within and from the continent. Its rec-

alongside citizens in social security systems and that

ommendations include enhanced collection and analysis

states should facilitate the portability of benefits across

of gender disaggregated data on migrants’ “economic

borders. Combined, the Code’s gender and migrant pro-

activity, employment, skills, education, working condi-

visions should in theory provide a framework for female

tions, and social protection.” It also references the AU

migrants’ access to social security, but the reality is that

Labour and Social Affairs Commission’s 2013 Youth and

state-provided social security is limited in most SADC

Women Employment Pact that includes the “promotion

member states even for citizens;

its goals;

•

Remarkably, for a document that is otherwise so broadranging, including reference to a suite of international

The SADC’s Charter of Fundamental Social Rights (2003)

Conventions and Charters, the 2008 Protocol on Gen-

refers explicitly to the UN Universal Declaration on

der and Development almost entirely omits reference

Human Rights, African Charter on Human and People’s

to migration. There is reference to “human trafficking,

Rights and ILO Constitution, but is couched largely in

especially of women and children.” Along with the

the language of workers’ rights. It contains no express

anti-trafficking provision, the Gender Protocol does

provisions dealing with the social rights of migrants as

include recommendations for adequate remuneration

a category. Gender rights of “equality between men and

and protection of agricultural and domestic workers and

women” are expressed in terms of employment, remu-

recognition of women’s contribution in the informal sec-

neration, equal opportunities and the right to reconcile

tor. These could be interpreted as potentially beneficial

occupational and family obligations. Given the infor-

to migrant women in those occupational categories,

mal nature of many female migrants’ livelihoods, formal

especially when read in conjunction with the 2014

labour protection instruments may have limited impact

Employment and Labour Protocol; and

in practice. The Social Charter is also weakly enforced;
•

security by men and women, gender sensitization in

The AU’s Labour Migration Governance for Develop-

of regional and sub-regional labour mobility” as one of

•

The 2007 Code on Social Security aims at the co-ordina-

•

Most of the rights and protections in the SADC’s 2014

Article 19 of the SADC 2014 Protocol on Employment

Labour Migration Policy Framework are expressed in gen-

and Labour includes a clause “to adopt measures to

der-neutral terms of migrant workers and their families,

provide for the special needs of women, children and

but there are express provisions to “harness positive gen-

youth”. Article 20 calls for the promotion of productivity,

der considerations and demographic dividends” of labour

decent work and rights protection in the informal sector,

migration, along with elimination of discrimination and

which is of particular significance for migrant women.

abolition of forced and child labour. As formulated and
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adopted, the Framework stands to benefit all migrant

November 2000 and convened regular inter-governmental

workers, although its emphasis on formal employment

forums attended by senior bureaucrats from Departments

makes it potentially less applicable to women migrants.

of Immigration and Home Affairs in member states (as well

Its effectiveness, moreover, depends on its recommen-

as other ministries on an ad hoc basis).78 In 2010, MIDSA

dations being actively adopted and implemented by

was scaled up to ministerial level with a conference in

national governments.

Windhoek on Managing Migration through Regional Co-

In sum, there are challenges in advancing gender-sensitive,
rights-based migration governance in the SADC region. The
scale, complexity and diversity of migration, combined with
incomplete and inconsistent data, certainly make it difficult
to measure and monitor the gender composition of migrant
flows and stocks, or to understand the particular contributions and vulnerabilities of female migrants.
Regional-level instruments, polices and protocols do exist,
but these are barely enforced and national laws and institutions take precedence. The persistent limitations of migration
governance on the continent have been recognized as an
obstacle to regional and continental poverty reduction by
the African Development Bank in a report that also points to
the vulnerability and marginalization of female migrants.74
Furthermore, policies and instruments to protect migrant
and gender rights are implemented within a difficult social
and political context in which xenophobic and patriarchal
attitudes persist.
Overall, SADC and AU policies and protocols on migration
tend to emphasize the vulnerability of female migrants,
rather than their role as active economic actors and contributors to development. A recent Overseas Development
Institute (ODI) briefing on women and migration concludes
that “[f]or women and girls to benefit from mobility, policies
must support the empowerment and economic benefits of
migration and also increase protection of female migrants.”75
This dual focus on empowerment and protection should
guide programming and policy development on gender and
migration in the region.

operation.79 A second Inter-Ministerial Conference was
convened in Maputo, Mozambique, in 2013 on Enhancing
Labour Migration in the SADC Region and a third in Victoria
Falls, Zimbabwe, in 2015 on Addressing Mixed and Irregular
Migration in the SADC Region: Protection of the Unaccompanied Migrant Child.
In 2012, MIDSA developed a Regional Roadmap on Enhancing Intra-Regional Migration for Sustainable Development.
The roadmap was subsequently revised and endorsed as an
Action Plan at the MIDSA Ministerial in Maputo in 2013.
The Action Plan is non-binding and there is some overlap
between its recommendations and those of the SADC Labour
Migration Policy Framework and Article 19 of the Protocol
on Employment and Labour. However, it also covers a range
of other development-related areas that are absent from the
SADC instruments. The current plan is that governments
will annually report progress in achieving the goals of the
MIDSA Action Plan.80
As acknowledged by the senior officials and Ministers who
participate in MIDSA, it is precisely the informal, non-binding and consultative nature of the process that makes it
possible to develop recommendations that would not have
been made if they were to be binding on participating states.
This does not mean that these conclusions and recommendations are of no value – on the contrary, it is because MIDSA
acts as an awareness-raising “clearing house” that formal
processes on migration and development within the SADC,
and even at national level, might be able to advance at a
more rapid pace in future. The SADC Secretariat has been
a regular participant in MIDSA, although the relationship
has remained informal. In 2013, as part of a sustainability

MIGRATION DIALOGUE FOR
SOUTHERN AFRICA (MIDSA)
Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA) has
become the forum that most clearly articulates the relation-

strategy, member states agreed that MIDSA should be incorporated into formal SADC structures and processes, though
this has yet to take place. There are questions about whether
and when this should happen, and whether it could negate
the value of the MIDSA process in driving the debate about
migration and development in the region.

ship between migration and development in regional and

Unlike other RCPs, MIDSA has relied on donors for funding

national policy discussions and tends to drive the regional

its activities without financial contributions from member

migration and development debate within the SADC.76

states. This outside funding is of a short-term nature. While

MIDSA is one of several global and African Regional Con-

the IOM plays a strong leadership and organizational role, it

sultative Processes (RCPs) on migration that have emerged

does not guarantee the MIDSA’s sustainability. While there is

since the mid-1990s. These are informal, non-binding, inter-

a significant international literature endorsing the value of

state forums for dialogue on migration matters of mutual

RCPs in building regional co-operation on migration, there

interest.77 MIDSA was founded in Mbabane, Swaziland, in

has been no systematic evaluation of the achievements and
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impact of MIDSA in its 16 years of operation. Until this has

•

Ideas about how the ratification of inter-governmental

been undertaken, results-based donors and member states

agreements and protocols might be fast-tracked include

may be reluctant to commit the resources to sustain MIDSA’s

a SADC commission of government officials and experts

goal of advancing a development agenda around migration

to make recommendations and move forward as matter

in Southern Africa.

of urgency; to create a timeframe for ratification; and
to implement advocacy workshops with parliamentarians to lobby the SADC heads of state for ratification of

CHALLENGES FACING A
REGIONAL RESPONSE

instruments. If a government feels that a protocol is not
in line with its interests it will not fast-track it. To address
this, there is a need for diplomacy and negotiation which
should involve helping each country understand the

Stakeholder Perceptions of Challenges

value of migration and appreciate the benefits for their
country of ratification and of creating an enabling environment for migrants;

The stakeholder interviews elicited a wide range of opinions
on the obstacles to a regionally co-ordinated and harmonized
response to harnessing regional migration for development

•

monization of national policies in the SADC region is

and inclusive growth. The results of the NVIVO analysis of

gradually occurring through the MIDSA process and the

responses are summarized below:
•

SADC Labour Migration Framework. However, unless

The main obstacle to a regional response is the high

governments integrate migration into national develop-

level of economic disparity between SADC member

ment plans and budget for this, it is impossible to expect

states. This has led to a level of protectionism among

implementation; and

the economically stronger states. High poverty levels
within SADC countries are also an obstacle to a regional

•

There is a gap in reliable data around migration with
most people using estimates. The quality and availability

response. Addressing the issue of inequality and poverty

of data for mapping migration flows and for under-

on a national level is prioritized by governments, thus

standing the impacts of migration on development is

deflecting their focus from regional to domestic issues;
•

Harmonization of migration policies is a key goal. Har-

poor. Greater evidence production would enhance

Another major obstacle to the implementation of SADC

inter-governmental co-operation in terms of migration

regional migration policies and agreements is a lack of

management.

political commitment at the national level. Other obstacles to implementation are lack of data and information
and lack of capacity of government officials. SADC coun-

Political Analysis of Challenges

tries overcommit to international issues and do not have
the apparatus to manage regional agreements;
•

•

ness of governments to commit to the development and

Other challenges of implementing a regional approach

implementation of specific regional policies and pro-

include limited funding for tackling migration and

grammes. However, most of the existing agreements and

development issues at the regional level; no regional

protocols are signed at ministerial level. Thus, at least at

or strategic plans; limited information and interest by

the level of principled agreement, there does seem to be

member states to focus on migration as a regional issue;

a degree of political will and a commitment to the less

limited implementation of various protocols and lack of

contentious regional instruments.

enforcement mechanisms; and different administrative
systems in place in each member state;
•

Xenophobia is a major obstacle to a regional approach as
migrants often become scapegoats for a lack of government delivery. In order to tackle the issue of xenophobia
the following were mentioned: awareness raising; educating communities; creating understanding of the role of
migration in labour development and national development in the country; training the media; and getting
policy makers to understand the positive role of migration in development;

Absence of Political Will: This refers to the unwilling-

•

Lack of Capacity: A significant reason for the slow
progress in developing a cohesive set of policies and programmes aimed at harnessing the development benefits
of migration, both at national and regional level, is the
absence of properly mandated and resourced institutions.
This is not limited to the SADC Secretariat or national
governments – many of the civil society organizations
involved in migration-related research or programmes
are also constrained by lack of resources. The absence of
knowledge and expertise, as well as technical, logistical
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•

and financial resources, provides a major impediment to

downstream function to assess the potential and out-

both the development of appropriate policies and pro-

come of alternative policy choices. Similar to lack of

grammes and their implementation. Lack of capacity is

capacity, when lack of data is offered as a reason for slow

a problem that needs to be addressed before significant

progress, it is often dismissed as an excuse. However, it

progress in implementation can be made.

may in fact account for the lack of political commitment

Overlapping Institutional Mandates: Migration is often
referred to as a cross-cutting issue, requiring a high level
of co-operation and cohesiveness between government

in some cases, since policymakers are unlikely to introduce new policies and programmes if they are uncertain
about potential outcomes.

ministries and departments within national governments, which in turn needs to be replicated between
governments at the regional scale. At the level of the
SADC Secretariat, this “dilemma of jurisdiction” is
reflected in the fact that while it is the custodian of the
Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons, the
actual development of migration-related policies and
programmes is located elsewhere – in the case of labour
migration, within the SADC Employment and Labour
Sector. Ideally, and consistent with proposed approaches
to mainstreaming migration in national development
policies and programmes, the institutional mandate and
authority to develop and implement such policies and
programmes should be located in the highest office at the
national level and at the level of the SADC within one
part of the Secretariat, possibly the Directorate of Human
Development and Special Programmes.
•

Basic Principles
South Africa’s promised new migration paradigm was given
policy substance by the gazetting of the Green Paper on
International Migration in South Africa in Government
Gazette No. 40088 on 24 June 2016. The drafting of the
Green Paper represents the second major effort at overhauling South Africa’s immigration policy. The first process
began in 1997 when both a Green Paper and White Paper
were published and ended when the Refugees Act of 1998
and the Immigration Act of 2002 were adopted (following
which there were several amendments to both the legisla-

Disjuncture Between Regional and National Priori-

tion and the regulations, but no substantive redrafting). In

ties: The fact that many of the regional agreements are

many ways, the Green Paper represents a significant depar-

not reflected in national policies, legislation and pro-

ture from the way in which migration is currently managed,

grammes partly accounts for the slow progress because

not least because it begins to provide significant clarity in

implementation largely depends on national govern-

terms of policy vision and intent, even though there is still

ments allocating the necessary resources. This is often

a substantial need for discussion and consultation.

not done because regional migration priorities are not
seen as consistent with national priorities. Many governments prefer to view migration in negative terms, as a
threat to the interests of citizens and in need of control.
In this respect they often echo the views of their constituents who want to see a reduction in migration, tighter
controls, increased border controls, enforcement and
deportations, and who exhibit very low levels of tolerance of migrants even from neighbouring countries. This
inauspicious environment, in which the views of citizens
and the actions of governments are mutually reinforcing,
does not help national-level discussion about the development implications and value of regional migration.
•

SOUTH AFRICA’S NEW MIGRATION
PARADIGM

The Green Paper displays a fundamental tension between
existing control-oriented, securitized approaches to migration which start from the premise that migrants are a threat
or risk to national sovereignty and a more optimistic view
that migration can be harnessed for national interests. What
these contrasting, and at times contradictory, positions share
is the view that migration policy is fundamentally a matter
of protecting national sovereignty and national self-interest.
In this respect, the Green Paper advocates the need for a set
of common goals and objectives around which migration
policy can be developed and strategically managed to contribute towards the achievement of South Africa’s national
priorities, such as nation-building and social cohesion, inclu-

Absence of Reliable Data and Information: General

sive economic growth and national security. At its heart,

migration patterns and dynamics are reasonably well

therefore, is the articulation and defence of national sover-

documented but the development and inclusive growth

eignty and self-interest rather than any broader commitment

impacts of migration for countries of origin and destina-

to regional migration management, regional development

tion are less well understood, even among researchers.

and the realities of South Africa’s dominant economic role

The need for data collection and research also has a

in the region.
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In looking towards the framing of a new set of policy param-

to make strategic decisions on the recruitment and retention

eters, the Green Paper sets out key principles for migration

of skills.

policy:
•

•

means of transparent recruitment (something first proposed

tional migration in its national interests;

in the 1997 draft Green Paper and rejected by the then Min-

International migration policy must be oriented towards
Africa;

•

•

•

The Green Paper proposes (a) a points-based system as a

South Africa has a sovereign right to manage interna-

International migration policy must contribute towards

ister of Home Affairs); (b) that desirable immigrants should
be fast-tracked to permanent residence, a major departure
from current policy that is fixated on temporary migration; and (c) South Africa should increase its skills pool by

nation-building and social cohesion;

retaining students who have come to study in the country.

International migration policy must enable South Afri-

trained professionals for other African countries, and the

cans living abroad to contribute to national development

SADC region, this is clearly trumped by national self-interest.

priorities; and

Whether newly-minted graduates have the skills and experi-

The efficient and secure management of migration is the
responsibility of individual countries, all countries collectively and regional structures.

The most controversial proposals in the Green Paper relate

Although acknowledging that this could lead to a loss of

ence to fill skills needs is, of course, questionable. In essence,
since so many of South Africa’s international students are
from the SADC region, the proposed options for student
retention are likely to advantage South Africa and disadvantage the region as a whole.

to the country’s refugee protection regime and policy proposals to make it far less welcoming of asylum-seekers and
refugees. These proposals are based on the assumption that

Diaspora Engagement

the existing system is overwhelmed by bogus asylum-seekers,
a highly contentious argument given that it could equally

Unlike previous policy drafting exercises and proposals, the

be argued that South Africa’s failure to develop a coherent

Green Paper includes and emphasizes the need for a pro-

response to the Zimbabwean crisis is the root cause of the

active approach to engaging with South Africans in the

phenomenon of asylum-seeking by economic migrants (a

diaspora. The proposal involves setting up a diaspora institu-

problem now largely overcome by the granting of amnesty

tion to consolidate and integrate existing initiatives, but also

to Zimbabweans). The associated argument is that the courts

to expand engagement to include exchange programmes,

were wrong in granting asylum-seekers the right to work. By

investment, facilitating remittance transfers, and return and

removing this right, and confining asylum-seekers to recep-

reintegration. The GP acknowledges that South Africa has no

tion centres, it is assumed that the practice of asylum-seeking

diaspora engagement policy nor an institutional mechanism

by economic migrants will cease. This, of course, completely

for co-ordinating engagement. It notes that such institutions

ignores evidence of the positive economic contribution of

perform at least four functions: (a) promotion of emigration

refugees and asylum-seekers who, under existing law, are

to meet varied national goals such as labour and invest-

permitted to pursue economic livelihoods.

ment; (b) exportation and student exchange programmes;
(c) tapping into the resources of the diaspora – remittances,

Here we focus on the policy proposals that have clear devel-

investment, tourism and the sharing of skills and knowledge;

opment-oriented motivations and intended outcomes.

(d)?embracing diaspora communities through multinational
citizenship, consular services, country ambassadors and re-

Skills Migration
The Green Paper acknowledges that South Africa has critical skills shortages, that these gaps can be filled through
immigration and that the country needs to compete on the
global skills market. Much of this is consistent with current
strategies, but as the GP correctly notes, the system is administratively inefficient and lacks flexibility. What is lacking,
according to the GP, is an institutional arrangement that
ensures that labour market information is analyzed and used

integration programmes; and (d) reintegration of returnees.
The Green Paper proposes the establishment of a diaspora
institution to (a) consolidate existing initiatives under a single multifaceted emigration strategy; (b) establish a formal
and permanent mechanism to co-ordinate relevant government agencies and public policies relating to the needs of
South African expatriates; (c) registration of South African
expatriates and provision of consular services; (d) establishment of diaspora forums in countries with a high number
of South African expatriates; (e) establishment of diaspora
ambassadorial and knowledge networks; (f) provide ways
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in which emigrants can transfer skills back to South Africa,

regime that would facilitate the movement of low-skilled

such as visiting lectureships and public and private sector

economic migrants and entrepreneurs from other SADC

partnerships; (g) incentive schemes that will motivate South

member states. These include a quota-based SADC special

African expatriates to invest in the country; (h) a reintegra-

work visa, a SADC trader’s visa and a SADC SME visa. In

tion programme for those who want to return home; and

essence, these visas represent a special dispensation to low-

(i)?support mechanisms for those who want to emigrate for

skilled economic migrants from SADC, albeit with specific

study and work purposes.

requirements and conditions. This is a significant departure

The idea that the diaspora is a potential development
resource is a major departure from existing policy, as is the
proposal to institutionalize diaspora engagement. However,
as the GP notes, “further research in this area needs to be

from the current policy approach, which does not make
provision for low-skilled economic migrants. This lack of
provision, the Green Paper argues, results in higher levels of
irregular migration and “strategic asylum-seeking”.

undertaken and to inform proposals for the creation of a

The Green Paper argues that it would be easier to develop

South African diaspora institution.”

bilateral agreements with specific countries than attempting
to develop multilateral agreements that, by definition, would

Management of Regional Migration
The Green Paper constantly reiterates its African orientation.
From a migration and development perspective, this section
contains arguably one of the most important policy considerations for South Africa, and one that is significantly absent
from the current policy as framed by the 1999 White Paper

take longer to conclude and implement.
This integrationist approach to migration policy represents
a more welcoming and positive approach to low-skilled economic migrants from the SADC region but the Green Paper
does not discuss the potential response from South Africans
to such an approach and makes no proposals to mitigate
potential negative reaction.

on International Migration. Locating the issue of migration
within the broader context of regional integration, this section effectively proposes that migration is a key element
both as a means towards, as well as an outcome of, integration and development in Africa.

Development Implications
The focus on the need to harness the benefits of migration
for development and, in particular, the emphasis on “man-

Following an analysis of some of the existing instruments

aging migration in the national interest” suggests that there is

and initiatives pertaining to migration, the GP effectively

a long-term policy view that no longer confines the man-

commits South Africa to the development of a migration

agement of migration to regulating the entry and exit of

policy that supports the efforts of regional bodies to achieve

persons, but fundamentally links it to the aspirations, needs

higher levels of integration, which by implication means a

and developmental priorities of the country. Less articulated

commitment to free movement, or at least facilitating the

is a vision for South Africa’s role in regional development

movement of persons. Of particular relevance is the focus of

or an assessment of what the implementation of policies

the Green Paper on the management of economic migration

animated by national interests might mean for other SADC

from the SADC region to South Africa.

countries.

The Green Paper recognizes not only the historical reality

That said, the Green Paper does recognize the need to link

of economic migration to South Africa from other SADC

migration policy and management to the imperatives of con-

member states, but also argues that migration patterns are

tinental and specifically SADC co-operation and integration.

unlikely to change and that policy has to be responsive to

In this regard, the proposals pertaining to the special permits

this reality. Specifically, it recognizes the challenges related

and other mechanisms for citizens of SADC member states

to low-skilled economic migration and puts forward poten-

and other African countries are particularly relevant. Regret-

tial policy options to be considered. In these options, the GP

tably, these proposals may prove to be the most controversial

essentially takes a middle-of-the-road approach, noting the

and difficult to implement, given the current public climate

absence of regulated mechanisms for low-skilled economic

of hostility towards all migrants in South Africa. The GP

migration while acknowledging the futility of trying to stop

does not specifically address the issue of official and public

it.

sentiments and attitudes towards migrants and migration

On the other hand, the Green Paper acknowledges that free
movement is not a reality and thus proposes a permitting
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focusing on a set of shared interests and outcomes, is critically important.

Gender and Migration
The Green Paper mostly treats economic and humanitarian migration streams as if they are gender-neutral flows of
individuals bearing identifiable attributes or skills. Given
the strongly gendered nature of the labour markets (skilled
and unskilled) in which migrants do or will participate,
the specific employment sectors and skills determinants by
which prospective immigrants will be admitted will have
different effects on men and women and produce genderimbalanced migration streams. None of the data presented
in the Statistical Profiles of International Migrants in the
GP is broken down by gender. This makes it impossible to
identify the gender composition of current migrant flows or
how these change over time or vary by employment sector,
visa category or country of origin. Collection and analysis of gender-disaggregated data should be undertaken to
assess the impact of current policy and inform further policy
development.
The absence of consideration of gender or sexual identity
in the section on refugees and asylum-seekers is notable.
The GP proposes substantial changes to the current refugee and asylum policy and practice. Considerable attention
is given to the “safe third country” principle, and there is
a proposal to establish asylum-seeker processing centres
near South Africa’s borders, where asylum-seekers would be
accommodated while their applications are processed. Each
of these measures, if implemented, raises concerns in terms
of gender and sexual identity. Politically stable countries
designated as “safe” may not be so for individuals seeking
asylum on grounds of social rather than political persecution
– for example, people who identify as LGBTQ. Asylum-seeker
processing centres are likely to be difficult places in which
to guarantee safety and protection for women, children and
other vulnerable groups. The proposed restriction of the
right of asylum-seekers to work removes an important survival strategy and may force women (and men) into practices
that make them vulnerable to violence and exploitation,
such as sex work.
No migration policy can be entirely gender-neutral in its
outcome and impact. Furthermore, to ignore the gender
dimensions of migration policy risks undermining both
economic objectives and humanitarian obligations. It is
important that gender considerations be incorporated in
the next stages of policy development.
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CHAPTER 5: OPTIONS AND
ENTRY POINTS
INTRODUCTION
A regional migration programme for Southern Africa needs
to be guided by, and contribute directly to, the implementation of various strategic regional instruments. This section

by existing programmes; (b) to identify gaps in current programme and/or areas that need strengthening; and (c) to
identify the main stakeholders involved in regional migration for development and inclusive growth.

PRIORITY PROGRAMMING
AREAS IDENTIFIED IN
MIGRATION INSTRUMENTS

therefore presents the results of an analysis of the provisions
and recommendations of these regional and inter-regional

A major objective of this report is to relate potential pro-

strategic frameworks/agreements. All of the instruments con-

gramming for harnessing migration for development and

tain specific recommendations for programming that could

inclusive growth to relevant continental and regional strate-

harness migration for development and inclusive growth.

gic instruments. A systematic approach to these instruments

Section 5.2 develops a 10-point thematic programming

could assist in briefing all stakeholders about their objectives,

framework (PF) based on the objectives and content of the

content and relevance to migration in Southern Africa. The

instruments and then extracts and classifies specific recom-

instruments reviewed include the following:

mendations from each instrument and incorporates them

•

2016 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

•

2015 Valetta Accord (VA)

migration-related programmes on which information was

•

2006 African Union Framework (AUF)

collected in the fieldwork and are currently being imple-

•

2006 African Common Position on Migration and Devel-

into the PF.
Section 5.3 then uses the PF to classify the existing regional

mented or planned in Southern Africa. This analysis has
three main purposes: (a) to identify areas already covered

opment (ACP)
•

AU Joint Labour Migration Programme for Africa (JLMP)

TABLE 14: PROGRAMMING FRAMEWORK
Issue

Entry Points

Addressing the Relationship between Migration and Development

Mitigating Root Causes
Mainstreaming Migration

Enhancing Regional Co-operation on Migration Management for Development

Facilitating Free Movement
Harmonizing Policies and Frameworks
Building Institutional Capacity

Promoting Decent Employment

Implementing Better Policies
Guaranteeing Better Work
Designing Temporary Programmes

Ensuring Rights and Protections for Migrants

Eliminating Exploitation
Securing Social Protection
Countering Xenophobia

Facilitating Skills Migration

Removing Barriers
Recognizing Qualifications
Retaining/Importing/Building Skills

Adding Value to Remittances

Improving Financial Literacy
Reducing Remittance Costs
Optimizing Remittance Uses

Incorporating Gender Dimensions of Migration

Promoting Awareness
Supporting Female Migrants

Building Migrant Entrepreneurs

Entrepreneurial Support
Cross-Border Trade

Engaging Diasporas

Building Linkages
Encouraging Contributions

Creating a Knowledge Platform

Migration Data Collection
Information Exchange
Research Priorities
Capacity-Building
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2005 SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of

To classify the many recommendations and commitments

Persons (SADC Facilitation)

in these instruments, and to identify areas common to each,
we developed a programming framework (or PF) with 10

•

2014 MIDSA Action Plan (MAP)

•

SADC Labour Migration Policy Framework (SADC LMPF)

cific recommendations relating to harnessing migration for

•

SADC Protocol on Employment and Labour (SADC EL)

development in each instrument and allocated them to the

issues and related entry points. We then extracted any spe-

appropriate issue and entry point.

TABLE 15: ANALYSIS OF RECOMMENDATIONS IN REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS
1. Addressing the Relationship between Migration and Development
Mitigating Root Causes
■ Enhance employment opportunities and revenue-generating activities in regions of origin and transit of migrants, including through
public and private investment in favour of agriculture and rural economy development (VA).
■ Put in place strategies aimed at reducing poverty, improving living and working conditions, creating employment opportunities and
developing skills that can contribute to addressing the root causes of migration (AUF).
■ Acknowledge that productive investments can help to address some of the causes of migration, recognize the need to promote economic growth by fostering trade, productive investment and employment, and implement economic and social policies geared towards
alleviating migration pressures (AUF).
Mainstreaming Migration
■ Integrate migration in development and poverty eradication strategies and programmes, in particular in areas such as labour market/
employment, private sector development, education, health, social protection and security (VA).
■ Facilitate technical co-operation activities with international agencies and other concerned entities to enhance the developmental
effects of labour migration (AUF).
■ Encourage AU member states to integrate migration and development policies in their national development plans (AUF).
■ Integrate migration and displacement issues into the national and regional agenda for security and stability in addition to development
and co-operation (AUF).
■ Include migration in the framework of development strategies and national and regional programming with the purpose of supporting
the economic and social development of the regions from which migrants originate in order to address the root causes of migration and
reduce poverty (AUF).
■ Mainstream migration in national development plans (ACP).
■ Conduct training workshops for participants from government, private sector, civil society and worker organizations on mainstreaming
migration into national development policies (MIDSA).
■ Strengthen regional integration and inclusive development (JLMP).
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2. Enhancing Regional Co-operation on Migration Management for Development
Facilitating Free Movement
■ Step up efforts to promote legal migration and mobility within bilateral co-operation frameworks such as Mobility Partnerships and
Common Agendas on Migration and Mobility (VA).
■ Enhance co-operation and co-ordination among states in sub-regions and regions with a view to facilitating free movement from which
an Africa-wide framework on the free movement of persons should be developed (AUF).
■ Harmonize sub-regional migration policies to promote free movement and right of residence (AUF).
■ Ensure intra-African freedom of movement of migratory flows (ACP).
■ Achieve wider elaboration, adoption and implementation of harmonized free circulation regimes and coherent national labour migration
policy in the regional economic communities (JLMP).
■ Facilitate the movement of persons in the SADC as a vehicle for achieving economic integration (SADC Movement).
Harmonizing Policies and Frameworks
■ Support continental, regional and sub-regional frameworks for mobility and migration (VA).
■ Develop a common migration policy among African countries towards harmonization of laws, standards, procedures, information, dissemination and sharing, statistics, documents, and efficient use of resources (AUF).
■ Look for collective solutions to migration through bilateral, multilateral and regional agreements and dialogue in a manner that benefits
all parties: origin country, destination country and migrants (AUF).
■ Develop national and regional migration policy frameworks to address national/regional migration issues (MAP).
■ Draft a template for common regional standard operating practices related to migration management (MAP).
■ Encourage the development of migration policies for member states that do not have a policy in place (MAP).
■ Harmonization of national labour and employment legislations on the rights of foreign workers aligning to various treaties, protocols
and conventions (SADC LMPF).
■ Adoption of a common set of co-operation principles on labour migration (SADC LMPF).
■ Mapping and harmonization of legislation leading to the adoption of consistent policy frameworks at sub-regional level (SADC LMPF).
■ Ensure coherence between labour migration, employment policies and other development strategies within member states (SADC EL).
Building Institutional Capacity
■ Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and
well-managed migration policies (SDG Target 10.7)
■ Set up national and sub-regional social dialogue mechanisms to address migrant labour issues (AUF).
■ Encourage regional consultative processes and dialogue on irregular migration to promote greater policy coherence at the national,
sub-regional and regional levels (AUF).
■ Establish regional mechanisms for tripartite policy consultation and co-ordination on labour migration issues, and facilitate consultation
and co-operation with other regions (JLMP).
■ Initiate dialogue with other Regional Co-operative Processes, such as EAC and COMESA, in order to discuss migration in an integrated
manner and find solutions inter-regionally (MAP).
■ Design and implement a capacity-building training programme for government, civil society, private sector and worker organizations
(MAP).
■ Create a SADC labour litigation mechanism (SADC LMPF).
■ Technical training and assistance to migration and labour ministries, unions and employers’ organizations on migrant workers’ rights,
drawing on international, regional and SADC frameworks (SADC LMPF).
■ Strengthen labour inspectorates across SADC member states (SADC LMPF).
■ Create a legal and policy framework within the SADC through harmonized labour and social security legislation (SADC EL).
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3. Promoting Decent Employment
Implementing Better Policies
■ Establish regular, transparent and comprehensive labour migration policies, legislation and structures at national and regional level
(AUF).
■ Implement labour migration policies and legislation that incorporate appropriate labour standards to benefit labour migrants and
members of their families (AUF).
■ Incorporate provisions from ILO Conventions 97 and 142 into policy (AUF).
■ Create transparent (open) and accountable labour recruitment and admissions systems based on clear legislative categories and
harmonizing immigration policies with labour laws (AUF).
■ Strengthen governance and regulation of labour migration and mobility in Africa (JLMP).
■ Harmonize labour migration policy and legal frameworks (MAP).
■ Harmonize required documentation for SADC migrant workers employed within the region and without (SADC LMPF).
■ Harmonize visa requirements for work permits for SADC nationals and third-country nationals (SADC LMPF).
■ Harmonize pension and social security in both private and public schemes (MAP).
■ Harmonize fundamental rights of migrant workers (MAP).
■ Harmonize work-seekers’ visa requirements for SADC nationals (SADC LMPF).
Guaranteeing Better Work
■ Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women
migrants, and those in precarious employment (SDG Target 8.8).
■ Incorporate mechanisms that monitor the provision of decent work for migrants and enable them to access legal provisions for social
protection (AUF).
■ Provide social protection and social security benefits (particularly unemployment insurance, injury compensation and pensions) for
labour migrants (AUF).
■ Ensure labour migrants experiencing job losses are adequately provided for or receive financial assistance for return and resettlement
(AUF).
■ Enable better social and economic integration of migrants, effective labour and social protection mechanisms, and sustainable labour
market systems (JLMP).
■ Support decent work for migrants with effective application of labour standards to migrant workers (JLMP).
■ Ensure migrant workers have access to social benefits, health services and continuum of care across borders (MAP).
■ Inform potential migrants, returning/seasonal migrants of their rights and of minimum standards, of possibilities to claim those rights
and report abuses (SADC LMPF).
■ Educate migrant workers, labour representatives and employers regarding the implications of legal requirements (SADC LMPF).
Designing Temporary Programmes
■ Promote fair recruitment practices (VA).
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4. Ensuring Rights and Protections for Migrants
Eliminating Exploitation
■ End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence and torture against children (SDG Target 16.2).
■ Take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour, including recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour in
all its forms (SDG Target 8.7).
■ Strengthen the capacities of local authorities and civil society to advocate for and protect rights of migrants (VA).
■ Ensure effective implementation by relevant national authorities of existing legislation and measures against employers who exploit
irregular migrants (VA).
■ Create an enabling environment for migrant rights to be respected including allowing migrants to defend their rights by forming migrant
associations (AUF).
■ Ensure the respect of the dignity and the protection of the rights to which migrants are entitled under international law, especially the
right to equal treatment (ACP).
■ Effectively provide protection to abused migrant workers by designing and implementing emergency plans in situations of gross rights
abuses and safety infringements (SADC LMPF).
■ Harmonize regional labour migration policy in order to protect and guarantee equal rights and access to decent and productive work
for migrant workers (MAP).
■ Adopt a regional migration policy to ensure the protection of the rights of migrants (SADC EL).
Securing Social Protection
■ Extend social security to migrants through access and portability regimes compatible with international standards and good practice
(JLMP).
■ Harmonize legislation towards better inclusion of migrant workers into state-provided social services (SADC LMPF).
■ Harmonize and monitor the delivery of migrant workers’ social rights in the private sector in the framework of a decent work agenda
across the region (SADC LMPF).
■ Ensure that fundamental rights are accorded to non-citizens, in particular labour/employment and social protection rights (SADC
Employment).
■ Establish an autonomous regional agency to address cross-cutting issues pertaining to social protection such as streamlining and
facilitation of portability of social security benefits across borders, stipulating applicable regional minimum standards and regulating
institutional mechanisms that guarantee relevant entitlements, rights and obligations across borders (SADC Employment).
Countering Xenophobia
■ Encourage the development and implementation of national and regional strategies or policies for integrating migrants into host societies and for counteracting xenophobia and discrimination (VA).
■ Promote respect for, and protection of, the rights of labour migrants including combatting discrimination and xenophobia (AUF).
■ Disseminate information about migrants, through public information and education campaigns and other means, to promote respect
for, tolerance and understanding of migrants, and to counter anti-immigrant and xenophobic attitudes (AUF).
■ Implement the relevant elements from the Programme of Action of the World Conference Against Racism and Xenophobia, including
measures to ensure the fair and non-discriminatory treatment of migrants, regardless of status, with particular attention to preventing
discrimination against women and children (AUF).
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5. Facilitating Skills Migration
Removing Barriers
■ Promote the mobility of students, researchers and entrepreneurs (VA).
■ Maximize the contribution of skilled professionals in the continent by facilitating mobility and deployment of professionals in a continental and regional framework (AUF).
■ Recognize the relevance of short-term migration and the movement of persons in the context of trade of services, stressing the need
for more information on the movement of highly skilled workers and on the “trade value” of such moves (AUF).
■ Set up a dialogue between all government agencies dealing with migration, trade and labour issues in order to establish means of
dealing with temporary movement of persons supplying services (AUF).
■ Encourage the movement of skilled African labour between the host countries and the countries of origin (ACP).
■ Create an environment conducive to circular migration (brain circulation) (ACP).
■ Relax entry requirements for service providers, ensuring non-discriminatory treatment in the terms and conditions of service, as well
as elimination of the economic needs tests in recruitment (ACP).
■ Boost the growth of a regional skills pool based on facilitated circulation within the region and increased attractiveness (SADC LMPF).
■ Explore the scope for SADC multilateral and bilateral agreements to encourage circular migration of skilled personnel (e.g. twinning
of medical schools and health care facilities) (SADC LMPF).
Recognizing Qualifications
■ Identify, as a pilot, one or more professions where participating states commit to making progress on facilitating recognition of skills
and qualifications (VA).
■ Resolve skills shortages and skills-education mismatches while increasing recognition of harmonized qualifications (JLMP).
■ Establish the state of available skills regionally in critical sectors and an inventory of barriers to their circulation (SADC LMPF).
■ Establish the scope for standardization of skills recognition across the SADC (SADC LMPF).
Retaining/Importing/Building Skills
■ By 2020, substantially expand globally the number of scholarships available to developing countries, in particular least-developed
countries, small island developing states and African countries, for enrolment in higher education, including vocational training and information and communications technology, technical, engineering and scientific programmes, in developed countries and other developing
countries (SDG Target 4b).
■ Elaborate a framework for social and economic offsets from host countries to mitigate the effects of large-scale departures of highly
skilled African professionals in critical sectors (ACP).
6. Adding Value to Remittances
Improving Financial Literacy
■ Support financial education and inclusion of migrants and their families (VA).
■ Encourage the transfer of remittances by adopting sound macro-economic policies conducive to investment and growth and appropriate financial sector policy that encourages financial institutions and their outreach (AUF).
■ Create incentive strategies for remitters in commercial, entrepreneurial, savings and other productive activities (AUF).
Reducing Remittance Costs
■ By 2030, reduce to less than 3% the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher
than 5% (SDG Target 10.C).
■ By 2030, reduce to less than 3% the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than
5%. In addition, identify corridors for remittance transfers where the partners commit to substantially reducing the costs by 2020, from
Europe to Africa and within Africa, in compliance with existing national legislation (VA).
■ Increase the volume of transfers through formal remittance channels (VA).
■ Develop mechanisms, services and effective financial products to facilitate the transfer of funds of emigrants and reduce the costs of
these transfers (ACP).
■ In co-ordination with the African Institute for Remittances, determine ways to strengthen the infrastructure for remittance transfers that
can be adopted and modified for implementation by individual states (MAP).
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Optimizing Remittance Uses
■ Implement country-specific programmes, maximizing the impact of remittances notably in rural areas (VA).
■ Explore, identify and promote innovative financial instruments to channel remittances for development purposes (VA).
7. Incorporating Gendered Dimensions of Migration
Promoting Awareness
■ Promote equality of opportunity by strengthening gender-specific approaches to policies and activities concerning labour migration,
particularly in recognition of the increasing feminization of labour migration (AUF).
■ Integrate a gender perspective in national and regional migration and management policies and strategies (AUF).
■ Promote campaigns to raise awareness about gender dimensions of migration among policy makers and personnel involved in managing migration (AUF).
■ Enhance collection, exchange and utilization of gender and age disaggregated data on migrants’ economic activity, employment, skills,
education, working conditions and social protection (JLMP).
Supporting Female Migrants
■ Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other
types of exploitation (SDG Target 5.2).
■ Strengthen responses to the needs of migrant women, particularly ensuring that their health needs, labour rights and human rights
are respected (AUF).
■ Take effective steps to counter migrant trafficking and smuggling and other illegal practices that specifically target and victimize migrant
women (AUF).
■ Adopt measures to provide for the special needs of migrant women, children and youth (SADC EL).
8. Building Migrant Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurial Support
■ Create new economic opportunities for young women and men through initiatives focused on, among others, targeted measures to
create jobs and employment opportunities and stimulate entrepreneurship (VA).
■ Step up support to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the formal and informal sectors including through access to
finance and micro-loans, training and incubation with particular focus on women, youth and rural populations (VA).
■ Promote migration schemes in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) including training programmes for African entrepreneurs (VA).
■ Create incentive strategies for remitters in commercial, entrepreneurial, savings and other productive activities (AUF).
■ Mainstreaming and harmonization of status and rights of self-employed migrants (SA LMPF).
■ Support to self-employed migrant workers’ organizations (SADC LMPF).
Cross-Border Trade
■ Support economic cross-border activities in border cities and markets (VA).
■ Mapping of main cross-border trade corridors and other activities adopted by self-employed migrants (SADC LMPF).
9. Engaging Diasporas
Building Linkages
■ Develop country-specific actions aiming at enhancing the development impact of migrant diasporas, both in the EU and associated
countries and in Africa, to their country of origin. In this context, develop diaspora investment models aimed at leveraging migrants’ savings for local business development and as a means of boosting local economic development (VA).
■ Further enhance the countries’ outreach to and the knowledge of their diaspora (VA).
■ Encourage entities such as the EU/AC, AU, ILO and IOM to assist in fostering stronger relationships between African states and the
African diaspora to create enabling conditions for the participation of migrants in the development of their home countries (AUF).
■ Make conscious efforts to reach out to diasporas and create channels of communication with them. Put appropriate institutional mechanisms in place that facilitate such communication and study the needs and incentives that might be required (AUF).
■ Create mechanisms for the strengthening of links between the countries of origin and African communities in the diaspora (ACP).
■ Develop a comprehensive set of policies and tools, including mapping exercises and outreach, related to diaspora engagement (MAP).
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Encouraging Contributions
■ Encourage nationals abroad to contribute to the development of their state of origin through financial and human capital transfers such
as short and long term return migration; and the transfer of knowledge and technology (AUF).
■ Promote the effective mobilization and utilization of diaspora funds for investment and development in the public and private sectors
(AUF).
■ Establish a reliable database on the diaspora to determine its extent and magnitude and to promote networking and collaboration
between experts in the state of origin and the diaspora (AUF).
■ Work towards the elaboration and implementation of policies that facilitate diaspora participation in the development of African countries (ACP).
■ Encourage inputs from the diaspora for the development of their countries of origin in the form of trade and investment activities, transfer
of funds, competencies, technologies and by permanent or temporary participation in development projects (ACP).
10. Creating a Knowledge Platform
Migration Data Collection
■ By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including least developed countries and small island developing
states, to increase significantly the availability of high quality, timely and reliable data that is disaggregated by income, gender, age,
race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts (SDG Target 17.18).
■ Enhance national and regional migration data collection, analysis and exchange to document the conditions and needs of migrant
workers and their families (AUF).
■ Formulate and implement a common regional data standard and other initiatives to strengthen regional efforts to collect, analyze and
share accurate basic information and data on the characteristics of migration in each country with a view to fostering migration and
regional integration (AUF).
■ Enhance data collection, analysis and exchange on labour needs and supply in states of origin and destination in order to match labour
skills with labour demand through comprehensive regional approaches (AUF).
■ Improve the quality of data on remittances and migration statistics to create a solid basis for policy action on remittances (AUF).
■ Establish a data bank on the scope of the brain drain phenomenon and qualified human resources (ACP).
■ Obtain relevant and comparable labour migration and labour market data (JLMP).
■ Develop standardized systems for data collection and analysis and harmonized migration indicators to be included in household
surveys (MAP).
■ Make arrangements for better collection, management and sharing of data (SADC LMPF).
■ Standardize data collection mechanisms across member states from census and border control data sets (SADC LMPF).
■ Standardize migration modules within labour market surveys (SADC LMPF).
■ Mapping of industrial sectors reliant on migrant workers and understanding of the nature of reliance (SADC LMPF).
■ Mapping of socio-economic actors involved in the organization of low-skilled labour migration (labour brokers, recruitment agencies,
ethnic networks and associations) (SADC LMPF).
Information Exchange
■ Ensure greater co-ordination between ministries and research institutions gathering migration data, including the establishment of a
migration statistics unit responsible for co-ordinating the gathering of migration statistics (AUF).
■ Constitution of a regional forum for exchange of information, experience and perspective among governments, and through which
a stocktaking of existing mechanisms and data could be undertaken, and bilateral and multilateral possibilities for data harmonization
considered (AUF).
■ Establish appropriate mechanisms to bring together national focal points in charge of migration for regular information exchange (ACP).
■ Increase availability of data and statistics on migration (MAP).
■ Update the MIDSA Report on Migration Data Harmonization (published in 2007) for the purpose of identifying gaps in the collection,
analysis, dissemination and harmonization of migration data (MAP).
■ Create a regular data collection mechanism and accessible platform within one existing member state statistics agency (SADC LMPF).
■ Promote labour migration data collection, analysis and exchange at regional and national levels (SADC Employment).
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Research Priorities
■ Encourage research to generate information, identify problems and devise appropriate responses and strategies (AUF).
■ Explore the possibility of co-ordi nating studies and research on migration and development by existing institutions with a view to placing
current and reliable information on migration at the disposal of states, sub-regional organizations and other users (ACP).
■ Initiate a SADC-wide migration profile study with a view to having a comprehensive overview of migration patterns and profiles within
the SADC region and assessing the implications for policy development at the national and regional level (MAP).
■ Mapping of regional migration corridors of low-skilled workers (SADC LMPF).
Capacity-Building
■ Conduct training workshops on migration data collection, analysis and dissemination for participants from national statistical offices,
national migration institutes and the SADC Statistical Department (MIDSA).

OPPORTUNITIES ASSESSMENT
•

the EU, ILO and the IOM are already fully engaged with
the SADC Secretariat on the latter. The new round of
EU funding for regional institution strengthening sug-

The SADC Secretariat has not been a leader to date

gests that DFID regional programming might be better

in advancing a regional migration and development

directed elsewhere.

agenda, primarily because of capacity challenges and the
responses of member states to past initiatives. EU support

•

•

growth is not yet a priority for SADC member states.

initiatives in planning or early stages of implementation.

Regional programming would therefore more profitably

MIDSA offers a more flexible institutional structure but

be directed at projects and programmes of regional scope

its ad hoc and non-binding nature means that an eval-

with the potential for a strong demonstration effect that

uation of its impact to date is a pre-condition for any

at the same time bring tangible support and benefit to

support.

the target migrant groups and populations. The next
section of the report develops this idea further by set-

Many of the recommended actions in the AU and SADC

ting out a programming framework of potential actions

instruments have not yet been acted on and those that

for harnessing migration for development and inclusive

have tend to be targeted more at national governments

growth and then using this framework to classify existing

than the region as a whole.
•

The non-ratification of the key SADC migration-related
protocols means that stakeholder engagement with a

initiatives and identify areas of potential intervention.
•

One possible alternative point of regional institutional
engagement would be ongoing support for and strength-

view to furthering ratification of protocols is unlikely to

ening of the MIDSA process. However, it is imperative to

yield substantive results. The lukewarm reaction of mem-

commission a comprehensive evaluation of the MIDSA

ber states to ratification of key instruments renders it

process from its inception in order to assess its activi-

unlikely that a donor-driven lobbying and implementa-

ties, achievements, outcomes and impacts with a view to

tion programme would achieve the desired effect. Donor

determining whether it is a suitable vehicle for advanc-

funds are better spent on programming that would have

ing a regional migration agenda on development and

as an outcome a clear demonstration to governments

inclusive growth with tangible results. Potential points

and regional bodies that migration does and can have

of intervention and leverage that could be facilitated and

beneficial migration and inclusive growth impacts for

supported would need to be identified. A subsidiary point

both countries of origin and destination.
•

Harnessing migration for development and inclusive

for the Secretariat may change this situation with several

is that MIDSA is still largely reliant on donor funding and

The Valetta Accord and AU Migration Framework and

would, at the very least, require matching contributions

Common Position offer the SADC Secretariat an oppor-

from member states to ensure long-term self-reliance and

tunity to take a lead role in designing and implementing

sustainability.

programmes on migration for development and inclusive
growth. In addition, the SADC Labour Migration Framework offers potential opportunities for optimizing the
benefits of labour migration for employment purposes
and, in particular, the target of each member state having a national labour migration policy by 2019. However,
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Some of the key areas for programming identified in the
analysis have received limited attention, for example,
skills migration, women’s migration, remittance uses,
diaspora engagement and migrant entrepreneurship.
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The challenge is to devise programmes that have a
regional remit and impact and take account of the
complexity of migration movements. The number of

STAKEHOLDER
RECOMMENDATIONS

potential programming partners with regional capacity
At the conclusion of the field interviews, the regional and

and focus is accordingly limited.
•

While there is a growing research literature on migration and development, much of this is focused on South
Africa and there is a dearth of regionally focused research
programmes.

•

national stakeholders were asked for their opinions on
proposed directions and priorities for a new regional programme. NVIVO analysis showed a clear concern with three
areas: (a) the existing governance mechanisms for migration
management at the regional level and doubts about their

Other regional programmes, such as the Freedom in
Work programme in Asia, offer potential models but the
issues and challenges in Southern Africa are somewhat
different and would require reconfiguration for the specificities of this region.

capacity and effectiveness; (b) the absence or lack of a broad
public and governmental awareness and recognition of the
positive development impacts and implications of migration within, to and from Southern Africa; and (c) the large
knowledge and information gaps that exist and how these
might be addressed. We have used these three concerns to
group, consolidate and classify specific recommendations.

TABLE 16: STAKEHOLDER PROGRAMMING RECOMMENDATIONS
Proposal

Comment
Migration Governance

Interventions should focus on migration “push factors” in counProjects to address the perceived drivers of migration assume that
tries of origin including high rates of unemployment, poverty and
migration is detrimental and have not been shown to be effective
inequality
FMM West Africa (the EU-ECOWAS programme) to support free
movement of persons and migration in West Africa could serve as
a model for Southern Africa

The new EU programme in support of SADC, COMESA and EAC
is partially modelled on FMM West Africa

Support and technical assistance could be provided to the SADC
The new EU programme in support of SADC, COMESA and EAC
Secretariat to facilitate ratification of the protocols and free
is designed to provide such support
movement
Support and technical assistance should be provided to member
states to facilitate national labour migration plans and to integrate
migration into national development planning

IOM and ILO are committed to implementing both of these
suggestions

Support the implementation of the MIDSA process and identify
areas to leverage for lobbying and advocacy

An evaluation of MIDSA’s achievements and potential is needed to
identify activities for support

Migration Capacity-Building
Design and implement an in-service programme for capacity- Such a programme operated at the University of the Witwatersrand
building in migration management for development for government between 2006 and 2010. Evaluations were positive but the proofficials, as well as civil society and unions
gramme was expensive without matching funding from governments
Integrate migration and development into the curricula of all existing training programmes including home affairs and labour officials,
police officers, nurses, social welfare staff, judiciary, prosecutors,
and teachers as a means of making input on migration more accessible to those who would be dealing with migrants directly and on
a daily basis

Prior to action on this suggestion, it would be necessary to compile
a complete inventory of training courses (regional and national), to
evaluate existing curricula and to design modules on harnessing
migration for development

Design and implement a professional degree (MA) programme
in Migration and Development to build the capacity and technical expertise of government, civil society, private sector and union
planners and decision-makers, as well as building a regional pool
of expertise

Discussions with Statistics South Africa suggest that they could be
interested in such a programme

Migrant Working Conditions

Improve the recruiting and working conditions of migrants, particularly women, in agriculture and domestic service

Some programmes are already targeting this issue though most
are not regional but focus on one country. The idea of undertaking
a pilot temporary work programme was mooted by TEBA. Further
discussion would be necessary as the company has tried, without
success, to extend the service it provides to mineworkers to the
agricultural and domestic work sectors
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Focus on the area of migrant protection. This could include work
at institutional level; for example, strengthening the national referral mechanism for victims of trafficking, unaccompanied migrant
children and vulnerable migrants, training on migrant protection,
working with multi-sectoral groups at border posts across the
region, such as border guards and social services. Such training
could include screening for vulnerabilities, proper referral, provision of protection, and voluntary return and reintegration strategies

This suggestion needs to be considered seriously either as an
objective in itself (along the lines of previous IOM programming)
or as one element of a more targeted programme, e.g. focused on
domestic workers or farmworkers

Continue work on remittances. Conduct a study on the usage and
impact of remittances and use the study to develop a community
development programme so that remittances are not used only
for basic needs but also for setting up businesses and investment

FinMark Trust has worked on remittances flows and reducing
remittance costs. The next logical step is to design and support
innovative programmes that encourage the productive use of
investments

Develop a framework and roadmap for small-scale traders

This proposal was the only one to target the informal economy
explicitly. Although there was no indication what the roadmap would
achieve, it could be the first step in a larger programme of support
for informal entrepreneurship

Facilitate engagement with the diaspora

No additional suggestions were provided but diaspora engagement
is a central pillar of the instruments reviewed and migration and
development programming more generally
Migration Data Collection and Use

There are major gaps in our understanding of migration at the
regional level and a great deal of misinformation that leads to negative and xenophobic outcomes. Most research to date has focused
Help to generate the evidence that would dispel myths about migraon proving the existence of rights abuse, understanding its causes
tion and demonstrate that it has positive development outcomes for
and documenting the hardships experienced by migrants. There
countries of origin and destination and migrants themselves
is much less evidence on migrants as active agents, seeking to
better their lives and generating positive impacts for development
and inclusive growth
Some respondents thought it would be useful to have a central
facility for the collection, organization and dissemination of migration data at the regional level; others were sceptical. Some were
Support the collection, analysis and use of migration data across hesitant about having a central facility for the collection, organizathe region as an aid to policy-making. This could be a combination tion and dissemination of migration data at the regional level but
of collecting and collating existing data and generating new data thought it could work if there were clear agreements on who would
through modules in labour force surveys and dedicated household use it. It was mentioned that it could have potential if it was indemigration surveys
pendently run but it would not be sustainable if donor funding runs
out. Data collection and management is already a central pillar of
the new EU regional support programme though the details have
yet to be worked out

GENDER AND MIGRATION
PROGRAMMING FOR
DEVELOPMENT AND
INCLUSIVE GROWTH

areas that are relatively neglected or underdeveloped and

The Programming Framework can be used by stakeholders

in Southern Africa. Our general starting point is the July

as a tool to identify potential development-related migration programmes and interventions. We reviewed existing
programming in Southern Africa and identified themes and

could constitute central entry points for programming. The
PF is reproduced below with the recommended action areas
highlighted.
Our main recommendation is for a programme on Gender and Migration for Development and Inclusive Growth
2016 ODI Briefing Paper “Women on the Move: Migration,
Gender Equality and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” and the UN-INSTRAW/UNDP Report on “Gender,

TABLE 17: PROPOSED ENTRY POINTS IN PROGRAMMING FRAMEWORK
Issue

Entry Points

Ensuring Rights and Protections for Migrants

Eliminating Exploitation

Adding Value to Remittances

Optimizing Remittance Uses

Incorporating Gender Dimensions of Migration

Supporting Female Migrants

Building Migrant Entrepreneurs

Entrepreneurial Support

Engaging Diasporas

Encouraging Contributions

Creating a Knowledge Platform

Research Priorities
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Migration and Gender-Responsive Local Development”.81

migrants, but knowledge and understanding of various

As the latter notes:

household forms and intra-household gender relations and
dynamics as they affect and are affected by migration. These

Studying the phenomena of migration and remittances
from a gender perspective…has yielded an understanding of the differences between women’s and men’s
migratory experiences, the ways in which gender relations are influenced or reinforced, and which factors
promote greater gender equity. In order for women’s
participation in the migratory process to contribute to
development, both in origin and destination countries,
it is necessary to go beyond isolated micro-projects in
order to enact public policies that eliminate obstacles
to their autonomy. The rise in women’s independent
migration can increase their decision-making power,
but certain factors must be taken into account in order
to guarantee equitable development including: the division of reproductive labour, access to education and
equal pay, access to land and credit and the guarantee of their rights of association and labour, among
others.82

surveys would ensure the collection of gender-disaggregated
data on a range of critical migration and development issues
including migration drivers, migrant characteristics and
motivations, migrant occupations and remitting behaviour, remittance channels and uses, and general migration
impacts at the household, community and national scales.
Only two countries in the SADC have conducted National
Migration Surveys in the past: Botswana in 1980 and
Namibia in 1998. Both surveys provided detailed insights
into the dimensions and drivers of internal and international migration in these countries at the time but are now
extremely dated. The World Bank and African Development
Bank Africa Migration Project conducted Migration and
Remittances Household Surveys in Burkina Faso, Kenya,
Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda in 2009-2010.
The surveys used a standardized methodology developed by
the World Bank and were conducted by primarily countrybased researchers and institutions during 2009 and 2010.
They covered recent migration and remittance trends, hous-

Entry Point One: Building a Gendered
Knowledge Base

ing conditions, household assets and expenditures, use of
financial services, internal and international migration and
remittances from former and non-former household members. Collectively, say the Banks, “these surveys provide

One of the recurrent themes in the stakeholder interviews

unique data and a new research methodology for collecting

was (a) the limited public availability and utility of official

information on migration and remittances in Sub-Saharan

data on migration; and (b) the lack of knowledge about

Africa.”83

migration causes, volumes, experiences and impacts. The
information that does exist comes from “add-on” questions

The Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) con-

to national or sample surveys designed for other purposes

ducted two nationally representative household surveys

and small-scale, local case studies on migration whose

in six countries in the SADC (Botswana, Lesotho, Mozam-

findings are not necessarily representative of the wider pop-

bique, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe) in 2005 and

ulation of migrants. A common failing of official data and

2006. The first (the Migration and Remittances Survey or

the case-study research literature is the absence of system-

MARS) focused on migrant-sending households, while the

atic and generalizable information on the gendered nature

second (the Migration and Poverty Survey or MAPS) sam-

of migration. In order to provide detailed, policy-relevant,

pled migrant and non-migrant households. The surveys

gender-disaggregated data on migration and its development

covered a wide range of household and individual migrant

impacts, a different methodological approach is needed. Our

characteristics, migration motives and behaviours, migrant

recommendation is for the collection of national migra-

occupations and remitting practices, and the relationship

tion data at the household level in countries of origin and

between migration and local development as well as migra-

destination through the implementation of nationally rep-

tion and gender.84 These surveys have and continue to be

resentative surveys of migrant-sending households.

widely cited but represent the situation a decade ago. They
do not capture, for example, recent evidence that some

The knowledge and policy value of this kind of methodol-

migration streams are becoming more permanent in nature.

ogy is clearly illustrated by previous projects whose findings
are widely cited as the only authoritative sources of data on

We recommend another round of national migration sur-

all aspects of migration in the SADC region, including its

veys using these tested methodologies and instruments in as

gender dimensions. Survey instruments and sampling strate-

many SADC countries as funding allows. There is an urgent

gies should be designed and implemented in such a way as

need for the kind of current and comprehensive data and

to permit not merely comparison between male and female

information that such surveys provide. As well as providing
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the critical gender-disaggregated information on migration

migrant women. We therefore recommend a regional pro-

and development that does not currently exist, the findings

gramme directed at improving the conditions for women

could be used to build the evidence-based demonstration

and youth migrating to and working in the domestic service

effect of the possibilities for further harnessing migration

sector. Existing research tends to be of a narrow case-study

for development and inclusive growth. The data would also

nature but has identified some of the major challenges faced

inform the development and implementation of the other

by women migrants recruited by labour brokers and oth-

work packages suggested below. Potential outcomes include

ers, travelling to places of employment, poor treatment by

the following:

employers and constant vulnerability to exploitation and

•

Filling of information and data gaps on the relationships
between migration, development and inclusive growth;

•

Current, actionable information on migration dynamics and development impacts and potential in countries
of origin and destination, including differentiation by

•

•

deportation due to uncertain legal status. The obligations
enshrined in the Domestic Workers Convention contain
commitments to domestic workers for the effective promotion and protection of human rights including the right
to freedom of association and collective bargaining; the
elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; the

gender and household type;

effective abolition of child labour; and the elimination of dis-

Demonstration effect of positive development implica-

Convention also promotes the need for a minimum wage;

tions of migration by men and women in the region,

the right to a safe and healthy work environment; effec-

to support regional co-operation and management ini-

tive protection against all forms of abuse, harassment and

tiatives including ratification of protocols and other

violence; enjoyment of fair terms of employment as well as

regional initiatives such as MIDSA; and

decent working and living conditions; the use by employers

Design of gender-based programmes and interventions based on solid and reliable information on gender
dimensions of migration.

crimination in respect of employment and occupation. The

of appropriate, verifiable and easily understandable written
contracts; social security protection and effective access to
courts, tribunals and other dispute resolution mechanisms.
The precarious legal position of migrant domestic workers

Entry Point Two: Protecting Female
Migrants in Domestic Work
The SADC Labour Migration Framework has as two of its

makes it easier for employers to circumvent some or all of
these commitments. The Convention also elucidates several
goals that apply specifically to migrants including that:
•

objectives (a) strengthening protection of the rights of

offer, or contract of employment that is enforceable in

migrant workers; and (b) harnessing positive gender con-

the country in which the work is to be performed, prior

siderations and demographic dividends. These objectives

to crossing national borders for the purpose of taking up

urgently need to be realized in the low-wage sectors in

the domestic work to which the offer or contract applies;

which migrant women and girls tend to concentrate, espe-

and

cially domestic work. The Preamble to the 2011 Domestic
Workers Convention notes that “domestic work continues

Migrant domestic workers who are recruited in one country for domestic work in another receive a written job

•

To effectively protect domestic workers, including

to be undervalued and invisible and is mainly carried out

migrant domestic workers recruited or placed by pri-

by women and girls, many of whom are migrants or mem-

vate employment agencies, against abusive practices, it

bers of disadvantaged communities and who are particularly

is necessary to (a) determine the conditions governing

vulnerable to discrimination in respect of conditions of

the operation of private employment agencies recruiting

employment and of work, and to other abuses of human

or placing domestic workers; (b) ensure that adequate

rights.”85 A programme focus on the rights and protection

machinery and procedures exist for the investigation of

of women and girl migrants would materially advance these

complaints, alleged abuses and fraudulent practices con-

objectives and potentially enhance implementation of the

cerning the activities of private employment agencies

Labour Migration Framework and the Domestic Workers

in relation to domestic workers; (c) adopt all necessary

Convention.

and appropriate measures to provide adequate protection

The field research confirmed that several civil society groups,
NGOs, unions and international organizations are beginning
to focus their attention on the precarious employment of
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for and prevent abuses of domestic workers recruited or
placed in its territory by private employment agencies;
(d) recruiting of domestic workers in one country for
work in another should ideally be governed by bilateral,
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regional or multilateral agreements to prevent abuses

evidence of the involvement of formal and informal labour

and fraudulent practices in recruitment, placement

brokers in recruiting and placing farm and domestic work-

and employment; and (e) take measures to ensure that

ers, more research is needed on how the system works and if

fees charged by private employment agencies are not

and how the basic rights of migrants are violated; (c) while

deducted from the remuneration of domestic workers.

migrants in the Work in Freedom corridors are generally

The extent to which employers, labour brokers and governments are in breach of the Convention is unknown and
needs to be systematically researched. The largely informal,
unorganized nature of domestic worker recruitment in this
region makes it difficult to assess or monitor, but this only
adds to the urgency of doing so. Further, programmes to

working legally in the destination country, this is not often
the case in Southern Africa. Because irregular migration and
work status make migrants vulnerable to a set of abuses in
the workplace and in the neighbourhoods in which they
live, this would need to be a central focus in a programme
for Southern Africa.

inform and educate domestic workers of their rights, and

Potential outcomes of programming in this area include the

employers and employment agencies of their obligations,

following:

are needed.

•

Implementation and monitoring of the protections

Because most migrant women in domestic work tend to

enshrined in the Domestic Workers Convention in coun-

move along major migration corridors, there is a strong

tries that have ratified the Convention;

case for adopting a corridor-focused approach to programme
implementation. Two corridors, in particular, are known

•

vention in non-ratifying countries;

to be significant avenues for migrant women in domestic
work: the Zimbabwe-Gauteng-Western Cape corridor and the
Lesotho-Gauteng corridor. By focusing attention on these

•

ers and impacts of precarious employment in domestic

ing migrant domestic workers and materially affecting the

work;

employment conditions of migrant women, this work pack•

economic growth.

•

worker protection in Southern Africa and therefore requires

into low-wage sectors in other countries;
•

recruitment standards; and

in women and girls from South-East Asia to the garment and
ing Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates. While
trafficking is a concern in Southern Africa generally, there
is less evidence that it is a significant problem in relation

Private sector recruitment agencies and labour brokers
adopt ethical principles and practices, in line with fair

additional comment. Its primary aim is to combat trafficking
domestic work sectors in major destination countries includ-

Maximizing economic and other benefits to households
and communities from the migration of women and girls

The Work in Freedom programme in Asia is a potential
model for integrated programming on migrant domestic

Women and girls enjoy greater protection while migrating and in the workplace in low-wage sectors;

protect and guarantee the rights of vulnerable workers and
ensure that they benefit from, and contribute to, inclusive

New and better evidence generated on women and girl
migrants in low-wage employment and the nature, driv-

two corridors, identifying the challenges and obstacles fac-

age can have a strong demonstration effect on the need to

Identification of practices that are in breach of the Con-

•

New legal or policy initiatives are implemented to protect
and guarantee the rights of women migrant workers (in
transit and in the workplace).

to employment in domestic service. The Work in Freedom
programme has a main focus on promoting ethical and good
industry practices among the intermediaries between countries of origin and destination in the so-called “recruitment
industry.”
The primary differences between the Work in Freedom corridors and those in Southern Africa are (a) the length and
complexity of navigating the corridors. In Southern Africa,
geographical proximity and ease of overland travel by minibus taxi means that informal, individualized migration is
much more feasible; (b) the reliance of Asian migrants on
unscrupulous intermediaries given the cost and logistical
challenges of long-distance migration. While there is some

Entry Point Three: Maximizing
Remittance Impacts for Women
Migrants
Several programmes have been designed to understand
remitting practices and channels, improve financial literacy and reduce the costs of remitting, especially by SAMP
(2005-2008)86 and FinMark Trust.87 With the exception of
one major but dated study by SAMP, little attention has been
paid to the gender dimensions of remitting in Southern
Africa.88 The SAMP study suggested that:
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•

•

For most migrant-sending households, migrant remit-

(including stokvels, savings clubs, burial societies, egg cir-

tances form the main source of household income. The

cles and co-operatives) and the ways in which individual

proportion of male and female migrants sending remit-

and collective remitting might enhance their activities; (b)

tances varied from country to country but was over

how financial remittances might enhance and meet wom-

two-thirds of all female migrants in each country;

en’s micro-entrepreneurship needs for start-up and working

The amounts of money remitted by female migrants were
significantly lower than those of male migrants, in part
reflecting women migrants’ lower levels of income and
employment security. However, women remit a greater
proportion of their earnings;

•

Lesotho’s female migrants remitted larger sums than
female migrants from any of the other countries;

•

Many female migrants come from female-centred
households, with no husband or male partner. Women’s
remittances are especially significant to such households as the primary – often only – source of household

•

•

•

capital, perhaps through financial matching programmes;
and (c) whether there is evidence of social remittances, such
as changed perceptions of gender roles, affecting women’s
economic and entrepreneurial activity in migrant-sending
communities.
There is considerable global and regional debate about how
best to harness remittances for development and inclusive
growth.89 The available evidence suggests that remittances
build three forms of capital: (a) human capital through
expenditures on food purchase, education, clothing, shelter,
transportation and medical expenses. This shows the importance of remittances to the well-being of the household and

income;

especially its younger members (through improved food

The main uses of remittances from both male and female

savings and investment in, for example, agricultural inputs

migrant-sending households were expenditures on the

such as seed, fertilizer and tractor hire; and (c) financial capi-

basic commodities of food, domestic fuel and clothing,

tal through micro-enterprise start-ups and expansion. The

and fundamental services such as schooling, health care

impacts of remitting on physical and financial capital remain

and transport;

largely in the realm of assertion rather than demonstration.

There were important gender differences, as well as dif-

IFAD’s Scaling Up Remittances (SURE) programme is a

ferences between countries, in the amounts of monthly

potential model for this programme. As IFAD notes, “the

expenditure on particular categories of expenses; and

impact of remittances is dramatically enhanced when linked

As the primary source of income for the majority of
households, remittance earnings are vital in enabling
households to meet their basic needs. Food is the most
common annual expenditure of remittance money in
both male and female migrant-sending households.
Second in all countries is either clothing or school fees.
Remittances do not appear to be spent on non-essential
or luxury items, but nor are they commonly directed
towards savings or investment in business or other productive activities.

While there is a need for updated regional data on the gendered dimensions of remitting (which could be garnered
through Work Package One), the priority is to devise practical, actionable programmes of support which would turn
remittances from meeting basic household consumption
needs into sources of productive investment by recipients
at the household and community levels. There are anecdotal examples of this: for example, Lesotho’s spaza shops
and taxi-cab industries were largely financed in the start-up
phase by migrant remittances. However, this work package
should seek to understand, perhaps through pilot studies, (a)
the kinds of self-help organizations established by women
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security, education and health); (b) physical capital through

to other financial services such as savings, insurance and
loan products. Inclusive financial systems and innovative
partnerships between financial institutions and remittance
operators can produce significant benefits by easing competition and reducing costs, thereby offering more resources to
the poor and increased options for families to use their capital to its maximum potential. In addition, migrants’ capital
savings have been proven successful at promoting entrepreneurship and local economic development back home.”90
IFAD’s rural focus assumes, as does much of the literature,
that such programmes should be rural-focused whereas it is
actually more likely that opportunities for the productive
use of remittances are greater in urban areas. Thus, we suggest that programming should focus more on urban-urban
remitting to have tangible results and benefits for inclusive
growth. Potential outcomes include:
•

Improved knowledge base on the uses of individual
and collective remittances by recipient households and
communities including support for productive use of
remittances to establish and grow micro-enterprises
(especially by women and youth), the extent and potential of collective remitting as a source of start-up capital
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and obstacles and challenges faced by actual and poten-

of migrant entrepreneurship in which women are particu-

tial micro-entrepreneurs;

larly involved is running businesses in their own countries

Identification of obstacles, challenges and opportunities for leveraging remittances to foster micro-enterprise
start-ups and development;

•

•

Demonstration effect of support of innovative, best-prac-

and using cross-border trading as a strategy to build their
businesses, profits and impacts. Migrant entrepreneurs are
still in need of various programmes of support to address
some of the challenges they face and to maximize their entrepreneurial activities and contributions. There is a dearth of

tice solutions for productive use of remittances; and

programmes supporting migrant women’s small and micro-

Micro-enterprises developed and job creation enhanced,

Migrants are generally excluded from government training

especially by women entrepreneurs, as part of the pro-

and support programmes.

gramme to harness remittances for development and
inclusive growth.

entrepreneurship activities and initiatives in Southern Africa.

There are several models that could be used and adapted to
the specific circumstances of actual and aspirant migrant
women entrepreneurs in SADC. These include the US African

Entry Point Four: Enhancing Female
Migrant Entrepreneurship
In cities throughout South Africa, migrants from other
countries (including forced migrants) are involved in the
establishment of small businesses to support themselves
and their families and to generate remittances to send back
to their home countries. As many as 60% of migrant small
business owners in South Africa are remitters. There is a
common (mis)perception that migrant entrepreneurs are
“survivalists,” forced to establish their businesses because of
a failure to obtain formal employment and operating with
razor thin margins. However, there is a growing body of
research that highlights the entrepreneurial orientation and
motivation of the majority of migrant business owners. Their
innovative business strategies have also been highlighted,
as have the challenges they face in establishing, operating
and growing their businesses. Studies have identified the
following as major business challenges: (a) economic challenges including shortages of start-up capital, lack of access

Women’s Entrepreneurship Program, which is described as an
outreach, education and engagement initiative that targets
African women entrepreneurs to promote business growth,
increase trade, create better business environments, and
empower African women entrepreneurs to become voices
of change in their communities.91 Another example is the
ILO’s Women’s Entrepreneurship Development Programme,
which “works with service providers promoting entrepreneurship development (financial, non-financial, public,
private, associative, freelance) and builds their capacity to
better support women entrepreneurs to start and grow their
businesses. It also works towards creating a more positive
enabling environment for WED, by supporting assessments
of the situation, and working with governments and policy
makers to remove the specific gender barriers that women
entrepreneurs may face.”92 This programme has primarily
focused on East Africa but a similar programme in Southern
Africa would be of considerable benefit. Potential outcomes
of programming are as follows:
•

New knowledge for public education and policy-mak-

to credit, competition from formal sector outlets and sup-

ing on the contributions of male and female migrant

pliers over-charging; (b) social challenges such as prejudice

entrepreneurs to the development of host and home

against their nationality and xenophobic attacks; and (c)

countries;

security challenges such as crime and theft, confiscation of
goods by the police, harassment and demands for bribes and

•

protection money, and physical attacks by the police. Most
migrant entrepreneurs start their businesses with personal
savings as they are unable to access bank loans and other

•

important development benefits to countries of origin

ships with local entrepreneurs;
•

businesses; and

foodstuffs and consumables, credit facilities, and job creasuppliers such as wholesalers and supermarkets). One aspect

Empowering of women migrant entrepreneurs to
establish and grow their in-country and cross-border

(through remittances) and destination (including cheaper
tion, as well as generating economic profits for formal sector

Ability of migrant entrepreneurs to run businesses more
effectively and profitably, create jobs and enter partner-

sources of start-up capital.
Despite these problems, migrant entrepreneurs deliver

Improved regulatory and operating environment for
migrant entrepreneurship;

•

Development of best-practice solutions to assist growth
of migrant-owned SMEs across the region.
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Entry Point Five: Deploying Diaspora
Skills for Women/Youth Empowerment
There is growing interest in the actual and potential role of
diasporas as a resource for development and inclusive growth

been developed by national governments (though Southern
African governments are not generally among them). However, “in reinforcing the African diaspora’s contribution to
development, there remains a critical role for regional bodies…and even regional economic institutions.”95

in Africa. Chikezie argues that diasporas possess five forms

The global Southern African diaspora represents a large

of diaspora capital (the “5 Cs”): intellectual capital, financial

skills and expertise pool, several million strong, that has

capital, political capital, cultural capital and social capital.93

not yet been effectively leveraged for development by

In order for African governments and regional organizations

Southern African countries. Some countries, such as Zambia

to engage effectively with diasporas, it is important to under-

and Zimbabwe, have official diaspora engagement poli-

stand what motivates diasporas to be involved in African

cies. Others are being developed (Table 18). South Africa

development: the “3 Ps” of pecuniary interests, private inter-

has declared its intention to engage with the diaspora in

ests and public philanthropic interests.94 As noted above, the

the new Green Paper. The Zambian government has been

Southern African region has a significant global diaspora.

the most proactive, establishing a Diaspora Liaison Office

Most diaspora engagement programmes and projects have

at Presidential level. Most recently, in September 2015,

TABLE 18: DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT POLICIES OF SADC GOVERNMENTS
Country/
Region

Policy Initiatives and Institutions

Priorities

AU

Citizens and Diaspora Directorate http://www.african-union.africa-newsroom.com/
press/citizens-and-diaspora-directorate-cido-towards-creating-a-diaspora-engagement-toolkit?lang=en

Facilitate diaspora engagement activities and policies
Diaspora engagement toolkit

Angola

Institute of the Angolan Communities Abroad and Consulate Affairs

Business investment consular workshops

Botswana

No formal policies

DRC96

No formal policies

Lesotho

97

No formal policies

Mauritius

Mauritius Diaspora Scheme http://www.diaspora.mu/government.aspx

Return migration

Madagascar

2015 Diaspora Directorate http://www.diplomatie.gov.mg/index.php?categorie10/
diaspora-malagasy

Strengthening linkages,
socio-economic projects,
promoting youth

Malawi

2012 Diaspora Engagement Programme and Diaspora Affairs Unit in Ministry Cooperation http://www.foreignaffairs.gov.mw/index.php/diaspora-services/overview

Remittances, investments,
skills transfer

Mozambique

2014 Strategy for Diaspora Engagement in National Development https://www.iom.
int/news/mozambique-launches-diaspora-engagement-strategy
National Institute for Mozambican Communities in the Diaspora (INACE)
IOM Diaspora Engagement Project https://developmentfund.iom.int/news/
iom-mozambique-launch-diaspora-engagement-project

Develop national diaspora
engagement policy

Namibia

Diaspora policy in development https://www.nbc.na/news/
namibia-develop-migration-policy-namibians-diaspora.1004

South Africa98

Hosted 2012 Global African Diaspora Summit http://www.dirco.gov.za/diaspora/index.
html
Diaspora engagement policy proposed in 2016 Green Paper on International
Migration

Swaziland

No formal policies

Tanzania99

Diaspora Engagement and Opportunity Department in Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and International Development (MFAIC) http://www.foreign.go.tz/index.php/en/about/
diaspora-engagement-and-opportunities-division
Tanzania Diaspora Conference 2016 http://tzdiaspora.org/concept-notes.html
Zanzibar Diaspora http://www.zanzibardiaspora.go.tz/

Investment, tourism, diaspora
database

Zambia

Diaspora Liaison Office in President’s Office
National policy framework in development100

Wide-ranging framework of
activities

Zimbabwe

2016 National Diaspora Policy
http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/zimsit-m-cabinet-approves-national-diaspora-policy/
Zimbabwe National Diaspora Directorate https://www.iom.int/news/
zimbabwe-launches-national-diaspora-directorate

Skills transfer, productive use
of remittances
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CHAPTER 5: OPTIONS AND ENTRY POINTS

the Zambian diaspora association in the UK (DfAD) organ-

•

Demonstration effect of successful skills and knowledge

ized a conference in London on Southern African Diaspora

transfer programme with impact at the regional level;

Communities in the UK. DfAD made two main points of

and

relevance: first, that policies should facilitate the setup of
sound and informed regulatory frameworks for the diaspora
to invest in development and job creation; and second, that

•

Commitment by members of the diaspora from individual countries to a regional vision of diaspora engagement.

the policy should ensure the portability of skills and benefits that would recognize the diaspora’s professional and
vocational qualifications. By identifying the existence of a
Southern African diaspora, the event went beyond the usual
conceptualization of individual countries engaging with
their own national diasporas abroad. This is where there is a
major programming gap to be filled, i.e. recognition of and
engagement with the regional diaspora at a regional level.
The general literature on diaspora engagement has identified
a range of potential areas including remittances, investment,
philanthropy, tourism, skills and knowledge transfer and
some countries, such as the Philippines, have instituted a
range of extremely successful diaspora engagement policies.
A regional diaspora engagement policy for Southern Africa as
a whole needs to be based on (a) a mapping of existing development-related initiatives by members of diasporas within
and from Southern Africa; (b) information about the types
of engagement activities that members of the diaspora are
interested in supporting or participating in at the regional
level; for example, Zimbabweans or South Africans abroad
being willing to engage in skills transfer anywhere in the
SADC region; and (c) the establishment of mechanisms that
would enable and facilitate engagement at the regional level,
perhaps initially in the form of a platform or marketplace for
being part of or supporting regional projects. To align this
proposal with the general theme of gender and migration,
such a programme could have a focus on developing diaspora support for projects and programmes that specifically
target enhancing gender equity and women’s empowerment.
Highlighting the achievements and tapping the skills of successful women in the diaspora could be a potential means
of changing gender perceptions and empowering women
in the region.
Potential outcomes include:
•

Improved knowledge base on current forms of regional
engagement by the Southern African diaspora, including
the role and significance of gender;

•

Creation of a platform or marketplace for the exchange
of ideas and information about engagement possibilities
at the regional level;

•

Utilization by civil society actors and the private sector of the skills of men and women in the diaspora in
development-oriented activities and programmes;
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APPENDIX A: STAKEHOLDER
CONSULTATIONS

Fieldwork was undertaken by a team of four fieldworkers from Southern Hemisphere Consulting. Country visits
were undertaken to South Africa, Mozambique, Botswana
and Zimbabwe. Interviews were conducted face to face
in-country, where possible, or telephonically. A total of 60
interviews with 86 interviewees were done.

Regional-level interviews
Stakeholder group
DFID regional office

Donors and international
agencies implementing programmes with a
regional focus

Regional organizations
(intergovernmental and
non-governmental)

Multilaterals

Regional organizations

Ministry/organization

Detail

DFID

Fiona Clark and Joel Harding

USAID
USAID Democracy and Governance Regional
General Development Office

Laura Berger, democracy HR and governance
team leader
Paula van Dyk, democracy HR and governance
senior programme specialist

Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation

Juliane Ineichen, deputy regional director of
co-operation

Save the Children (Southern and Eastern Africa)

Melinda van Zyl, Eastern and Southern Africa senior manager for child migration

International Alliance of Street Vendor
Organizations

Pat Horn

SADC Cross-Border Traders Association

Francis Ngambi

OSISA

Alice Kanengoni

Southern African Trust

Christabel Phiri

Finmark Trust

Brendan Pearce, head of programmes

IOM Regional/MIDSA

Richard Ots and Jo Rispoli

UNHCR

Amanuel Tesfayesus Mehari

UNDP

Osten Chulu

ILO

Joni Musabayana, Deputy Director: ILO

African Union

Peter Mudungwe, Migration Advisor for African
Union commission

EU

Mary Horvers, EU attaché , Regional Co-operation

GIZ

Phillip Madelung, programme manager, Cooperation for the Enhancement of SADC Regional
Economic Integration (CESARE)

Country-level interviews for South Africa
Stakeholder group
Affected groups
Donors and international agencies implementing programmes with a national focus

National government representatives (e.g.
immigration, social welfare, labour)

Academic institutions

Union

Ministry/organization

Detail

Scalabrini Centre

Miranda Madikane, Director

Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR)

Jacob van Garderen and David Cote

IOM South Africa

Josiah Ogina

EU Delegation to South Africa

Belen Calvo, political counsellor

Statistics South Africa

Miranda Mafafo and Themba Mohoto

Department of Health

Barry Kistnasamy, Compensation
Commissioner for Occupational Diseases

Department of Home Affairs

Lionel Isaacs

Department of Labour

Esther Tloane and three colleagues

GCRO

Sally Peberdy

African Centre for Migration & Society:
University of the Witwatersrand

Ingrid Palmary

COSATU
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Loren Landau
Bongani Masuku, Secretary, International
Department
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Country-level interviews for Botswana
Stakeholder group
Donors

Multilaterals
Unions
Academic institutions

Ministry/organization

Detail

GIZ

Sophia Gallina and Adane Ghebremeskel

Frederick-Ebert Stiftung

Ulrich Golaszinski

USAID Southern Africa Trade Hub

Gregory Maassen and Brian McCotter

UNHCR

Mandipa Machacha

IOM Botswana

Sikhulile Dhlamini

Botswana Federation of Trade Unions

Gadzani Mhotsha

University of Botswana

Teresa Galvin

University of Botswana

David Mandiyanike

Country-level interviews for Mozambique
Stakeholder group
Donors and international
agencies implementing programmes with a
national focus

Ministry/organization

Detail

IOM

Jason Theede, Programme Manager: Labour Migration and
Development / Migration and Health
Ruth Krcmar, Programme Coordinator: Migrant Assistance /
Integrated Border Management

GIZ

Peter Pfaumann, Country Director

UN Women

Ondina da Barca Vieira, Gender Programme Specialist

Affected groups

Mukhero Cross-Border Traders’ Association

Novela Sudecar, Director

Unions

Mozambique Workers’ Organization (OTM)

Florencio Quetane, Head of Chamber General Secretary
Antonio Paunde Machuquela, Head of Office of Communication, Image and International Relations

Academic institutions

Eduardo Mondlane University, Faculty of
Arts and Social Sciences, Centre for Policy
Analysis

Ines Macamo Raimondo, Deputy Dean of Faculty of Arts
and Social Sciences
Ramos Cardoso Muanamoha, Chief of Department

Country-level interviews for Zimbabwe
Stakeholder group
Donor

Ministry/organization

Detail

DFID country office (Zimbabwe)

Jessica Pettiprez, Social Development Advisor

Cross-Border Traders’ Association

Augustine Tawanda, Secretary General
Abel Jaridi, Treasurer

Labour and Economic Development
Research Institute Zimbabwe (LEDRIZ)

Nyasha Muchinchwa, Researcher

ILO – Zimbabwe and Namibia office

Adolphus Chinomwe, Senior Programme Officer
Hopolang Phororo, Director

IOM

Lily Sanya, head of mission
Knowledge Mareyanadzo, government liaison

UN Women

Rumbidzai Dube, Senior GBV co-ordinator

UNICEF

Allet Sibanda, programme officer CP
Noriko Izumi, Chief CP
Catherine Makoni, Gender and HR Specialist

Government

Ministry of Labour

Langton Ngorima, Acting Deputy Director
M.V. Hanga, Principal Labour Officer
M Parakokwa, Principal Labour Officer
T.C. Jongwe, Principal Labour Officer
S.T. Kadzima, Principal Labour Officer

Private sector

Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce

C. Mugaga, CEO

Unions

Zimbabwe Council of Trade Unions

Michael Kandukutu, national organizer
Fiona Magaya, gender co-ordinator

Academic institution

University of Zimbabwe

Innocent Chirisa

Affected groups

Multilaterals
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